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Abstract: China’s economic expansion into the United States has generated
intense debates and controversies. Some view it as posing a critical challenge to
extant U.S. institutions; others see China as a stakeholder of the extant system
and that the Chinese investors are by and large “playing our game.” However,
theories and hypotheses on the subject abounding, little is yet known how
exactly Chinese investors interact with U.S. institutions and the legal
implications of such interactions. Relying on the first comprehensive survey of
Chinese companies investing in the United States, this Article fills the gap with
an interdisciplinary study of the adaptation of Chinese investors to the U.S. legal
and regulatory systems. Under a novel analytic frame, the study finds evidence
that Chinese investors are largely commercially driven and adaptive to the host
country environment. The article further evaluates this general finding with a
case study, i.e., Chinese companies’ adaptation to U.S. institutions governing
employment discrimination, and finds confirming evidence. It then moves on to
the discussion of two often-debated threats from China’s business expansion in
the United States: the threat to U.S. national security and the threat to free
market capitalism. The empirical evidence suggests that Chinese investors are
unlikely to pose major threats to extant U.S. institutions in the near future. In
light of the findings, policymakers should resist the temptation to hastily erect
overly protective measures in response to the sharp rise of Chinese investments.
Regulated properly, Chinese investors may become major stakeholders of the
U.S. institutions and contribute to their long-term resilience.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper explores Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into the
United States and its legal implications from an interdisciplinary
perspective, with data from the first comprehensive survey of Chinese
companies investing in the United States. As China has surpassed the
United States to be the world’s largest economy,1 its business expansion
abroad has triggered intense debates and many controversies. The optimists
welcome it as providing much needed capital and knowledge without
ideological strings attached.2 The pessimists criticize the resourceorientation of the investments and their disruption to the market, legal, and
political orders of the host countries.3
While Chinese business expansion traditionally gravitated towards
developing countries, the United States has recently emerged as the leading
national recipient of FDI from China.4 Following this trend, American
scholars and policymakers are shifting their attention back home. The
debate about Chinese investment in the United States, however, has so far
relied mainly on anecdotal reports and case analysis.5 Insightful as some of
these studies are, a panoramic view of the broad trend remains elusive.
Moreover, extant studies rarely touch on the systemic and dynamic
interactions between U.S. law and China’s business expansion.
Based on the first ever comprehensive survey of Chinese companies
investing in the United States, this article fills the gaps. It contributes to the
debate about the implications of Chinese outward investment by exploring a
few basic but important questions—how Chinese investors perceive U.S.
business, legal, and political systems, whether they would adapt to this
foreign environment, and if yes, how? These questions are important
because Chinese investors readily adapting to U.S. institutions presumably
pose less of a threat. For instance, the U.S. subsidiary of Haier, a major
1

Measured in purchasing power parity. China Surpasses U.S. to Become Largest World Economy,
FOX NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/06/china-surpasses-us-to-becomelargest-world-economy.
2
See generally DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN
AFRICA (2010); Timothy Webster, China’s Human Rights Footprint in Africa, 51 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 626 (2013).
3
See generally Barry Sautman & Hairong Yang, African Perspectives on China-African Links, 199
CHINA Q. 728, 729 n.6 (2009); Denis M. Tull, China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and
Consequences, 44 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 459 (2006); Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, Better the Devil You
Know? Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, 12 J. AFR. BUS. 31 (2011).
4
See China Global Investment Tracker 2014, AM. ENTER. INST. (last visited Oct. 18, 2015),
http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map;
Derek
Scissors, A Third Straight Record for Chinese Investment in the U.S., AM. ENTER. INST. (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.aei.org/publication/third-straight-record-chinese-investment-us.
5
See, e.g., EDWARD S. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME: WHY CHINA’S RISE DOESN’T THREATEN
THE WEST (2010).
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Chinese appliances manufacturer, may well outperform its American
competitors, but policymakers should have less to worry if the only
differences between the two are brand name and improved efficiency and
customer service. On the other hand, if Chinese investors systematically
disobey U.S. law and code of business conduct, their growing presence in
this country will undoubtedly breed conflict and threaten extant U.S.
institutions.
This study proposes a novel theoretical frame to analyze the adaptation
(or lack thereof) of Chinese investors to host country institutions. It then
examines the data from the survey of Chinese investments in the United
States and finds preliminary evidence indicating their commercial motives
such as access to market, advanced technology, and brand enhancement
(See Figure 8). In addition, the survey findings suggest that Chinese
investors share a generally positive view of U.S. business, legal, and
political systems,6 despite recent damage to U.S. soft power. Moreover, the
study indicates that many Chinese investors, by relying heavily on local
talent and professionals, readily adapt to extant U.S. institutions.7 This
general finding is then evaluated and substantiated with an in-depth analysis
of Chinese investors’ adaptation to U.S. institutions for the prevention of
employment discrimination. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the
article further explores two of the most-debated threats of FDI from China,
i.e., the threat to U.S. national security and more broadly the threat to free
market capitalism
The article will proceed as follows. The next two subsections of Part I
present a summary description of China’s economic growth and expansion
abroad over the past few decades and the controversies and debates on the
impacts. Next, Part II presents the theory for analyzing the adaptation (or
lack thereof) of Chinese investors and lays the basis for an interdisciplinary
analysis of their impact on extant U.S. institutions. Part III then describes
the design and validity of the survey research on Chinese companies
investing in the United States. Applying the survey results, Part IV probes
the motivations of Chinese investors, their perceptions of U.S. business,
legal, and political systems, and their ability to adapt. Part V then evaluates
the general findings using an in-depth study of Chinese investors’
adaptation to U.S. institutions regarding employment discrimination. Part
VI examines two intensely debated potential threats Chinese business
expansion poses to the United States, i.e., threats to its national security and
to the U.S. model of free market capitalism. Last, Part VII briefly discusses
the contributions of the research, and Part VIII concludes the article.

6
7
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A. Growth of the Chinese Economy and Investment in the United
States
Measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), China has surpassed the
United States as the number one economy in the world.8 After four-decades
of unprecedented economic growth, China now tops the world ranking in,
inter alia, international trade,9 energy consumption,10 mobile phone users,11
automobile sales,12 steel production,13 foreign currency reserves,14 and
Internet users.15 Even measured at the current exchange rate, China is
already the world’s second largest economy and, baring natural, political, or
economic catastrophes of a very large scale, is set to overtake the United
States in about a decade.16 Yet given the size of the Chinese population and
its comparatively low level of living standard, the country still holds
enormous potential to grow.17 Some have even begun to contemplate
whether and when the Chinese economy would double that of the United
States.18
Decades of meteoric growth finally lifted the floodgate for China’s
outbound investment, which experienced a recent surge (See Figure 1) due
to a confluence of factors such as large current account surpluses, a huge
foreign currency reserve,19 growing corporate profits,20 and loosening
8

Measured in purchasing power parity. FOX NEWS, supra note 1.
China Eclipses U.S. as Biggest Trading Nation, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 10, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-09/china-passes-u-s-to-become-the-world-s-biggest-tradingnation.html.
10
Spencer Swartz & Shai Oster, China Tops U.S. in Energy Use, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703720504575376712353150310.
11
Gao Yuan, Nation Becoming Top Mobile Phone Market, CHINA DAILY (May 30, 2014),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-05/30/content_17552888.htm.
12
China Ends U.S.’s Reign as Largest Auto Market, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aE.x_r_l9NZE.
13
China Steel Industry Facing Harshest Ever Operating Environment, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-30/china-steel-industry-facing-harshest-everoperating-environment.html.
14
China’s Forex Reserve Returns ‘Relatively Good’, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-forex-reserve-returns-relatively-good-1402553350.
15
David Barboza, China Surpasses U.S. in Number of Internet Users, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/26/business/worldbusiness/26internet.html?_r=0.
16
Malik Singleton, OECD Report Says China’s Economy Will Overtake US Economy By 2016,
INT. BUS. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/oecd-report-says-chinas-economy-willovertake-us-economy-2016-1146333.
17
CRAIG K. ELWELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33604, IS CHINA A THREAT TO THE U.S.
ECONOMY? 14 (2007).
18
Economist: China’s Economy to Double That of US in 20 Years, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Mar. 24,
2011), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7330326.html.
19
WALL ST. J., supra note 14.
20
ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS OF CHINESE
INVESTMENTS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 5–6
(2012), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/
9
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government regulations.21 Much of Chinese investment outflows
traditionally took the form of sovereign debt, and Beijing’s vast holding of
U.S. treasury securities ($1,254.8 billion as of October 201522) has stirred
up a fair amount of controversies ranging from latent threat to U.S. national
security to the distortion of the credit market.23
While dust has yet to settle on the implications of China’s holdings of
U.S. sovereign securities, scholars and policymakers have shifted their
attention to the soaring outward direct investment. From a trivial amount of
$830 million in 1990, Chinese investment abroad reached $101 billion in
2013 (See Figure 1), making it the world’s third largest source of FDI.24
Though the outward FDI was at a time concentrated in Africa and other
developing regions for securing a stable supply of natural resources, more
Chinese companies are now targeting their investments at developed
markets.25

default/files/Research/11-712_An_Analysis_of_Chinese_Investments_in_the_U.S._Economy%28CTI%29.pdf
21
Yue-Fang Si, The Development of Outward FDI Regulation and the Internationalization of
Chinese Firms, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 804, 816–17 (2014).
22
Data available at the official website for U.S. Treasury Department. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS.,
MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF TREASURY SECURITIES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://ticdata.treasury.gov/
Publish/mfh.txt.
23
For a list of concerns with the implications of the large holdings, see WAYNE M. MORRISON &
MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34314, CHINA’S HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 10 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34314.pdf. For
the argument of moderate threat, see, for example, Daniel W. Drezner, Bad Debts: Assessing China’s
Financial Influence in Great Power Politics, INT. SECUR. 7 (2009). For the argument that low-cost
borrowing from China led to abundant cheap credit in the U.S. market, which encouraged excessive
debt-financed expansion, led to the real estate bubble, and eventually ignited the global financial crisis,
see Heleen Mees, How China’s Boom Caused the Financial Crisis, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/17/how_china_s_boom_caused_the_financial_crisis;
Neil Irwin, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke Says U.S. Policy Isn’t Causing Global Financial Woes, THE
WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/
02/18/AR2011021807046.html.
24
Karl Sauvant, Challenges for China’s Outward FDI, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 31, 2013, 7:10 AM),
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-10/31/content_17070440.htm.
25
Andreas Klossek et al, Chinese Enterprises in Germany: Establishment Modes and Strategies to
Mitigate the Liability of Foreignness, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 35, 35 (2012).
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Figure 1: China’s Total FDI Outflow (1990–2013; million U.S.
dollars)
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Data source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014, Annex table 02 - FDI
outflows, by region and economy, 1990–2013.

In line with this general trend, Chinese investment in the United States
has recently exceeded U.S. investment in China, reversing for the first time
in the past three decades the direction of net capital flows between the
world’s two largest economies.26 Historically, a backwater for FDI from
China,27 the United States holds irresistible charm to Chinese investors, as
evidenced by a recent Economist Intelligence Unit report ranking it number
one among more than 200 countries in terms of attractiveness to Chinese
FDI.28 True to this prediction, the United States has emerged as the biggest
national recipient of investments from China29 after a few years of
explosive growth (See Figure 2).

26

Toh Han Shih, China’s Surging Investment in US Heralds New Multinational Era, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1565759/chinassurging-investment-us-heralds-new-multinational-era.
27
China did not even enter the list of top ten investor countries, measured by the 2010–2012
average. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (Oct. 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2013fdi_report_-_final_for_web.pdf.
28
China Going Global Investment Index, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (2013),
http://china.ucsd.edu/_files/odi-2013/09232013_Paper_Liu_ChinaGoingGlobal.pdf.
29
AM. ENTER. INST., supra note 4.
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Figure 2: China’s Outbound FDI in the United States (2002–2013; million
U.S. dollars)
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Data source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.

B. Diverging Views on Chinese Business Globalization
Given its significant implications, the dramatic Chinese business
expansion abroad has caught close attention of scholars and policymakers
worldwide, who have expressed two diverging views: one welcoming the
expansion as broadly beneficial and the other dismissing it as a critical
threat. Those in the former camp observe an ascending China opting to
“play our game.”30 Enabled partially by embracing Western institutions,31
the Chinese business expansion will fortify the established system and
benefit the United States in the long run.32 Also, the existing global order is
sufficiently open and inclusive to accommodate a rising superpower
without necessarily experiencing any major disruptions. In addition, China
is distinguishable from previous emerging powers in the large stake it holds
in maintaining the extant global order.33 More concretely, Chinese direct
30

EDWARD S. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME: WHY CHINA’S RISE DOESN’T THREATEN THE
WEST 265 (2010).
31
Id.
32
Aaron L. Friedberg, The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, INT. SECUR. 1,
12–14 (2005).
33
G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 23, 29–32
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investment in the United States will bring immediate benefits such as new
jobs and additional research and development.34
Somewhat ironically, a few reach the same optimistic view by
trivializing the ability of Chinese multinational corporations to compete
with U.S. companies as Chinese entrepreneurs tend to focus on making
short-term gains, diversifying business, and cultivating good government
relationships.35 Moreover, seemingly “profitable” Chinese state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) rely heavily on various government subsidies and/or
their politically-secured oligopolistic positions in the Chinese market.36 To
these commentators the current concern with the Chinese business
expansion is little more than déjà vu.37 Despite the fear of and the prediction
about a rising Japan replacing the United States as the world’s economic
hegemon in the 1980s,38 the U.S. system eventually proved more resilient
and competitive.39
Another group holding the non-threat view, consisting mostly of
business scholars, sees Chinese investors’ global expansion track closely
conventional patterns of cross-border investment. Its net effect on the host
country is a function of multiple factors such as investment motives and the
development gap between the host and the home states.40 Companies from
developed countries, for instance, tend to transplant their corporate
governance and management style to their overseas operations. By
comparison, investors from developing countries, unable to rely on homedeveloped efficiency measures or technics, are more inclined to adapt to the
host state environment.41
On the other side of the debate are those perceiving the Chinese
economic expansion abroad as a critical threat.42 Some in this camp are

(2008).
34
See generally THEODORE MORAN & LINDSAY OLDENSKI, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: BENEFITS, SUSPICIONS, AND RISKS WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO FDI FROM CHINA
(2013).
35
See George J. Gilboy, The Myth Behind China’s Miracle, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 33, 42 (2004).
36
UNIRULE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, THE NATURE, PERFORMANCE, AND REFORM OF THE STATEOWNED ENTERPRISES 34 (APR. 12, 2011), http://www.unirule.org.cn/xiazai/2011/20110412.pdf.
37
Curtis J. Milhapt, Chinese Investment: A Case of Déjà Vu for the United States, 4 E. ASIAN F. Q.
1, 34 (2012).
38
The most famous work is probably by PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1989).
39
Sean Starrs, American Economic Power Hasn’t Declined? It Globalized! Summoning the Data
and Taking Globalization Seriously, 57 INT. STUD. Q. 817, 827 (2013).
40
See Randall Morck et al., Perspectives on China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 39 J. INT.
BUS. STUD. 337, 348 (2008).
41
Xiaohua Yang et al., A Comparative Analysis of the Internationalization of Chinese and
Japanese Firms, 26 ASIA PAC. J. OF MGMT. 141, 156 (2009).
42
For a summary of the pessimistic views, see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Future of U.S.-China
Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, 30 INT. SECUR. 1, 17–22 (2005).
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concerned with the practical risks of Chinese outbound investment,
especially in developing countries. Chinese companies investing in Africa,
for instance, have allegedly spawned corruption, disrespect of law and
human rights violations, and have on occasion even supported ruthless
dictators.43 Even Chinese officials lamented that the outbound investors
might be “exporting China’s domestic problems.”44 The threat may persist
as Chinese companies show a tendency to invest in resource-rich countries
with weak institutions45 and have a tolerance for high political risk.46
To some naysayers, the critical threat originates from China’s practice
of state capitalism.47 Supported by a highly interventionist government with
vast resources, Chinese SOEs pose a formidable challenge to free market
capitalism.48 And such challenge may not come only from the SOEs as
private Chinese companies, once recognized as national champions, will be
co-opted and receive the state’s largess.49 Given the resources controlled by
the Chinese government, its “corporate agents” pose at least a short or
medium-term threat to Western firms in the global market.50
Other opponents take notice of the Chinese government’s discontent
with the extant international system shaped and gingerly guarded by the
United States and its allies. To have more voice in global political and
economic affairs, China has undertaken initiatives to build alternative
multilateral institutions. It recently coordinated and sponsored the
establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank, viewed by some as
the developing country alternative of the Bretton Woods institutions for
financing global development.51 China has also proposed to create the Asian
43

For a brief summary of the negative media coverage of China-African links, see Barry Sautman
& Hairong Yang, African Perspectives on China-African Links, 199 CHINA Q. 728, 729 n.6 (2009);
Denis M. Tull, China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences, 44 J. OF MODERN
AFR. STUD. 459 (2006); Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, Better the Devil You Know? Chinese Foreign Direct
Investment in Africa, 12 J. AFR. BUS. 31 (2011).
44
Zhongguo
Qiye
“Zouchuqu”
Yao
Tupo
“Xingxiang
Kunju”
(中国企业
“走出去”要突破”形象困局”) [Chinese Companies Going Abroad Should Change Image], LIAOWANG
(瞭望) (Oct. 2, 2012), http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2012/10-22/4265426.shtml.
45
E.g., Bala Ramasamy et al., China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment: Location Choice and
Firm Ownership, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 17, 20, 23 (2012); Peter J. Buckley et al., The Determinants of
Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 38 J. INT. BUS. STUD. 499, 506, 510 (2007).
46
Diego Quer et al., Political Risk, Cultural Distance, and Outward Foreign Direct Investment:
Empirical Evidence from Large Chinese Firms, 29 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 1089, 1092 (2012).
47
The
Rise
of
State
Capitalism,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
21,
2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21543160.
48
See generally Ian Bremmer, State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?, 88
FOREIGN AFF. 40 (2009).
49
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese
Firm, 103 GEO. L. J. 665, 688–700 (2015).
50
The Rise of State Capitalism, supra note 47.
51
Raj M. Desai & James Raymond Vreeland, What the New Bank of BRICS Is All About, WASH.
POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
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Infrastructure Investment Bank,52 a regional multilateral institution to boost
China’s influence and to overshadow the Asian Development Bank
dominated by the United States and Japan.53 And soon after the global
financial crisis, China put forward a plan to replace the U.S. dollar as the
world reserve currency with special drawing rights based on a bundle of
currencies.54 Moreover, China inaugurated the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, an international body aimed at creating and expanding
military cooperation among the regional powers.55 Some are alarmed by its
potential to undermine democracy in the member states.56 In sum, the
pessimists raise a red warning sign stating that the ascent of China, if not
properly managed by the West, will mark the global turn heralding “a dark
era of ideological contention and geopolitical rivalry.”57
To summarize thus far, the burgeoning literature on the ramifications
of China’s global expansion reflects diverging views. The insights
generated from the debate, however, are inadequate to answer some of the
most pressing questions about the impacts of soaring Chinese FDI on U.S.
business, legal, and political systems. As noted earlier, one major
shortcoming of the literatures is methodological, as many have relied on
investigating a small number of Chinese companies.58 While ethnographic
studies can present valuable details and contexts about Chinese FDI in the
United States, the induced theories tend to be limited in application. Though
a few recent studies used survey and other quantitative methods,59 the
cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-bank-of-brics-is-all-about/.
52
Jane Perlez, U.S. Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2014, at A1,
A10.
53
Peng Lam, China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: East Asian Responses, 6 E. ASIAN
POLICY 127 (2014).
54
Jamil Anderlini, China Calls for New Reserve Currency, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7851925a-17a2-11de-8c9d-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3DcTbEkqs.
55
E.g., Jing-Dong Yuan, China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 855, 856 (2010); Pax Sinica: China is Trying to Build a
New World Order, Starting in Asia, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2014, at 39.
56
Thomas Ambrosio, Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia, 60 EUR.-ASIA STUDIES 1321, 1322
(2008).
57
CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, NO ONE’S WORLD: THE WEST, THE RISING REST, AND THE COMING
GLOBAL TURN 205 (2012).
58
See, e.g., STEINFELD, supra note 5, at 176; Yang et al., supra note 41, at 147 (using just two
institutions); Ping Deng, Why do Chinese Firms Tend to Acquire Strategic Assets in International
Expansion? 44 J. WORLD BUS. 74, 79 (2009) (using just three institutions); Huaichuan Rui & George S.
Yip, Foreign Acquisitions by Chinese Firms: A Strategic Intent Perspective, 43 J. WORLD BUS. 213, 218
(2008) (using just three institutions).
59
For instance, a critical literature review of all articles on the internationalization of Chinese firms
published in major scholarly journals found thirteen studies that used a survey method. Ping Deng, The
Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Critical Review and Future Research, 14 INT’L J. MGMT.
REVS. 408, 410 (2012).
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government-reported macro-level data they relied on to investigate Chinese
outbound investment were often biased and misleading.60 As a result, and
given that soaring FDI inflows from China are a relatively new
phenomenon,61 we are still in the dark as to why Chinese investors choose
the United States, how they interact with U.S. institutions, and whether they
will constitute a critical threat.
Another drawback of the literatures is their relatively narrow scope. As
most of the studies on Chinese outward investment were led by business
scholars and social scientists, the questions they have investigated rarely
touch on the dynamic interactions between the investors and the U.S. legal
and regulatory systems. Yet in contrast to most developing countries,
formal rules in the United States should play an essential role in shaping the
behavior of Chinese investors. Having neglected the legal dimension, the
literatures leave huge gaps.62
In sum, fast ascending the international pecking order economically
and politically, China and its global business expansion have attracted
enormous scholarly interest. Yet previous studies about the effects of
Chinese outward investment have left important questions under-explored.
Taking an interdisciplinary approach, this Article fills the gaps by
empirically investigating the adaptation (or lack thereof) of Chinese
investors to extant U.S. institutions. This Article will also provide
preliminary empirical analysis of the investment’s potential threats to the
United States by examining two much-debated topics: (1) the threat of
Chinese investors’ acquisition of U.S. assets to U.S. national security and
the adequacy of the CFIUS review regime to prevent or mitigate any such
threat, especially after the recent landmark decision by the D.C. Circuit
finding unconstitutional certain procedures of the CFIUS review in Ralls v.
CFIUS, and (2) the threat of the Chinese variant of state capitalism to the
U.S. model of free market capitalism. The following Part II presents an
analytical framework for examining the adaptation of Chinese investors to
U.S. institutions.

60

Dylan Sutherland & John Anderson, The Pitfalls of Using Foreign Direct Investment Data to
Measure Chinese Multinational Enterprise Activity, 221 CHINA Q. 21, 25–27 (2015).
61
SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 20, at 30.
62
For example, the differences between Chinese FDI and Japanese FDI in terms of local hiring are
attributed mostly to different stages of development of the two home countries. Yang et al., supra note
41, at 156. Little did the author discuss any possible impact of the Japan–US FCN Treaty that allowed
Japanese companies to appoint managers of their choice and the absence of such favorable treaty
benefits for Chinese investors in the U.S. Though a few legal scholars have begun to pay attention to
Chinese investment in the U.S., lacking empirical data, their research remains speculative. See, e.g.,
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Is the U.S. Ready for FDI from China? Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the
1980s, in INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: IS THE U.S. READY FOR FDI FROM CHINA? 185 (Karl
Sauvant, ed., 2009).
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II. A THEORY ABOUT CHINESE INVESTORS’ ADAPTATION
AND THEIR POTENTIAL THREAT
As noted in Part I, soaring investment outflows from China have
generated intense debates and controversies. The current debate about
China’s business expansion in the United States, in a nutshell, revolves
around three different levels of threat: the threat of Chinese investment to
U.S. national security, the threat to important interests of various social
segments such as labor rights, and the systemic threat of the Chinese model
of capitalism to free market economy. While the focus may vary, most
parties to the debate share the under-investigated and under-theorized
assumption that Chinese investors’ behavior systemically differs from their
U.S. competitors’.
This study contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it analyzes and
then empirically explores the key assumption that Chinese investors act
differently from their U.S. counterparts. Second, it engages in an
interdisciplinary analysis of the U.S. institutions’ responses to the potential
threat from China’s business expansion; it is unlikely for the perceived
threat to materialize if there exist adequate preventive and remedial
measures, or if the U.S. institutions prove more competitive and resilient.
A. The Desire and Ability to Adapt to U.S. Institutions
As Professor Edward Steinfeld elaborates in the study of a major stateowned Chinese oil company, Chinese investors may be adaptive and
“playing our game” in the global market.63 To further explore the adaptation
(or lack thereof) of Chinese companies, I employ a novel theory that
unpacks the concept into two components, the desire to adapt to U.S.
institutions and the ability to do so (See Figure 3).64 If Chinese companies
investing in the United States have both a strong desire and ability to adapt
(Quadrant IV of the two-by-two matrix), they will soon behave like their
local competitors; hence posing limited threats to extant U.S. institutions.
On the contrary, Chinese investors with neither the desire nor the ability to
adapt will transplant their home country practices to the United States
(Quadrant I), which may constitute a serious threat to the U.S. institutions
or social segments that have not adopted adequate protective measures.
Between the two ends of the spectrum are Chinese investors willing but
incapable of adaptation (Quadrant III) and those able but unwilling to do so
(Quadrant II). For purposes of this article, institutions are defined broadly to
63

STEINFELD, supra note 5.
In creating this typology, I draw on inspirations from the analytical framework for understanding
state-private business relations in China, see Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalists Without a Class: Political
Diversity Among Private Entrepreneurs in China, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 1130, 1145 (2005).
64
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include both formal rules such as laws and regulations, and informal rules
such as socially accepted code of business conduct.
From U.S. policy perspective, it should be optimal to have most of the
Chinese companies fall into Quadrant IV, where they exhibit both the
capacity and the desire to make necessary adjustments to the host country
environment. Conversely, Quadrant I probably identifies the worst fear of
those critical about Chinese outward investment. Quadrant III is not ideal
either. While superficial adaptation and compliance with U.S. institutions
may have been achieved, the Chinese investors will attempt to maintain
home-country practices whenever possible, potentially causing conflicts in
the host state, especially in areas of inadequate or uncertain formal
regulations. Quadrant II presents situations where investors will adapt
provided adequate capacity. Thus the threat tends to be temporary. This
study will empirically assess the distribution of the adaptation behavior of
Chinese companies investing in the United States. But before the
evidentiary analysis, more conceptual elaboration is in order.
Figure 3: Theoretical Framework for the Adaptation of Chinese Investors to
U.S. Institutions
Desire to Adapt to U.S. Institutions
No

Yes

No

I
will maintain Chinese
practices; potential longterm threat or disruption

II
will maintain Chinese
practices, but will adapt
whenever capable; potential
temporary threat or
disruption

Yes

III
may reluctantly and
superficially adapt, while
trying to maintain Chinese
practices;
some potential threat or
disruption

IV
will act like U.S.
companies;
limited potential threat or
disruption

Ability to
Adapt to
U.S.
Institutions

The desire and the ability to adapt are vague and broad concepts that
have to be further deconstructed to enable empirical analysis. I postulate
that Chinese investors’ desire to adapt is determined by two factors: (i) their
investment motives, and (ii) their perceptions of U.S. institutions. On the
other hand, the ability to adapt is a function of: (i) the corporate decisionmaking power allocation, and (ii) the access and use of knowledge and
skills requisite to make the adaptation. More details follow.

156

36

_1_3_LI SUPERFINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2/10/16 3:28 PM

Chinese Business Expansion
36:143 (2016)
1. The Desire to Adapt: Investment Motives and Perceptions of U.S.
Institutions
(a) Investment Motives
Motives are essential in setting behavior. Are foreign companies
investing in the United States driven by political concerns or commercial
interests? Companies following the government’s fiat to “go global” and
invest in the United States do not necessarily think or behave rationally in
the business sense, i.e., maximizing corporate profits, which presumably
affects their desire to adapt to local conditions. In contrast, foreign investors
attracted to the United States by business and commercial considerations
should respond to incentive mechanisms in ways analogous to private
companies. To them, U.S. regulatory and legal frameworks should function
more effectively since they are usually designed to shape the behavior of
rational business actors in a free market.
The question is more acute with regard to investment from China, as
the Chinese government plays a highly proactive role in regulating and
managing economic affairs. The unique Chinese model of state-business
relationships has been labeled state capitalism.65 A more systematic review
of the topic will be postponed to Section VI(B), but a brief summary
follows immediately to aid further discussion.
Before initiating economic liberalization in the early 1980s, the
Chinese government modeled its economic system after the Soviet Union
and almost all business entities in China were collectively owned and
managed.66 After various incremental reforms in the 1980s failed to
improve the performance of the SOEs,67 Beijing decided to shed the
liability by implementing massive privatization.68 Consequently, the state
sector shrank and the central government retained control only over the
largest SOEs in strategic and important sectors.69

65

A generally agreed definition of state capitalism is lacking. One defines it as “a system in which
the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain.”
Bremmer, supra note 48, at 41; another defines state capitalism as “the widespread influence of the
government in the economy, either by owning majority or minority equity positions in companies or by
providing subsidized credit and/or other privileges to private companies.” ALDO MUSACCHIO & SERGIO
G. LAZZARINI, REINVENTING STATE CAPITALISM 2 (2014).
66
Sujian Guo, The Ownership Reform in China: What Direction and How Far?, 36 J. OF CONTEMP.
CHINA 553, 556 (2003).
67
Id. at 559.
68
Ross Garnaut et al., Impact and Significance of State-Owned Enterprise Restructuring in China,
55 THE CHINA J. 35 (2006).
69
Id., at 52–53. “Between 1995 and 2001, the number of state-owned and state-controlled
enterprises in China fell from 118,000 to 47,000 and total employment in the SOE sector fell by 36
million.”

157

36_1_3_LI SUPERFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

2/10/16 3:28 PM

36:143 (2016)

Meanwhile, the central government took a series of measures to
further “modernize” the SOEs.70 As a result of the decade-long efforts, most
of the remaining central SOEs have concentrated their profitable assets and
operations in publicly listed companies with “modern” corporate
governance.71 The privatization through listing on stock markets, domestic
as well as foreign, diversified the ownership structure, enabled learning of
foreign practices and expertise, and opened channels for future finance.72
While by definition all SOEs are controlled by the government, the
abstract term “state” does not adequately explain how these conglomerates
are actually managed, and how they interact with government officials.
Actions taken by Chinese SOEs vary as a function of multiple variables
including the managers’ positions in the political hierarchy, ownership
diversity and density, the managers’ promotion probability and political
stature, and sectorial characteristics.73 Apart from the 140,000 SOEs
currently in existence, it has been alleged that the Chinese government
maintains close ties with private national champions and implements certain
state policies through them.74
China’s practice of state capitalism has also instigated the argument
that Chinese companies expanding abroad serve primarily the interests of
their home state, not their own or those of the host countries, especially in
cases of unalloyed interests. Those on the other side of the debate, however,
contend that commercial interests shape the investment behavior of Chinese
companies. To maximize profits and minimize risk, Chinese investors
aspire to “play our game” and do it well.75 This empirical study will weigh
in on this debate by analyzing survey data about the investment motives of
Chinese companies in the United States.
(b) Perceptions of U.S. Institutions
Besides investment motives, perceptions also form an important part in
the desire to adapt. Corporate executives who perceive their original
management style and organizational structure to be highly efficient will be
reluctant or refuse to make internal adjustments to comply with host
country rules. Likewise, companies that view the host country institutions
negatively will resist adaptation. Let me elaborate with the example of early
70

Ji Li, State-Owned Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State Arbitration, in THE ROLE
(Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco eds., 2014).
71
Gongmeng Chen, Have China’s Enterprise Reforms Led to Improved Efficiency and
Profitability?, 7 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 82, 87–88 (2006).
72
Id.
73
Li, supra note 70, at 380.
74
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese
Firm, 103 GEO. L. J. 665, 668–69 (2015).
75
STEINFELD, supra note 5, at 233.
OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 380
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Japanese investment in the United States.
As a result of rising trade conflicts, rapid appreciation of yen, and
quick economic recovery from World War II, the Japanese government
reversed its policies of heavily regulating outbound investment in early
1980s.76 A surge of Japanese outbound investment ensued.77 The Japanese
corporate structure and management model were dramatically different
from what had been familiar to American companies. Lifetime
employment, strict corporate hierarchy, and a high level of homogeneity in
the workforce contradicted not only the neo-classic economists’
prescriptions for corporate efficiency but also U.S. regulations against
employment discrimination.78
Many Japanese investors, regarding their model as superior to the one
for American companies, were reluctant to adapt.79 It was therefore
perceived as quite a common practice to fill positions in their U.S.
operations with employees expatriated from Japan, and to reserve
management positions for senior male Japanese.80 The Japanese
government shared the perception, noting that it “had devised a Japan
Model of growth far superior to the model long championed by the
economically troubled United States.”81 Not until the persisting
underperformance of the Japanese economy of the past two decades did the
Japanese companies start to act more like their U.S. competitors.82
In the meantime, the collision between the two systems forever altered
the U.S. legal landscape. Besides the drastic reform of the national security
review regime in response to surging Japanese acquisitions of strategic U.S.
assets,83 American jurisprudence with regard to a wide variety of subject
matter areas bears clear marks of legal responses to new legal issues
associated with Japanese investors in the United States.84
76

See generally You-Il Lee, Political Economy of Korean and Japanese Foreign Direct Investment,
29 J. OF CONTEMP. ASIA 462 (1999).
77
Id.
78
PETER HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 99–100 (2001).
79
Yang et al., supra note 41, at 141.
80
Sara Clark, Maintaining Yoshino’s Traditional Hierarchy: The Roles of Gender and Race in
Japanese Transplant Management, 9 J. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MGMT. 6 (1996).
81
GERALD L. CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS: LEADERS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE
LIMITS OF CHANGE 1 (1999).
82
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Is the U.S. Ready for FDI from China? Lessons from Japan’s Experience in
the 1980s, in INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: IS THE U.S. READY FOR FDI FROM CHINA? 185 (Karl
Sauvant, ed., 2009).
83
S. George Georgiev, The Reformed CFIUS Regulatory Framework: Mediating Between
Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and National Security, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 126 (2008).
84
For antitrust law, see, for example, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986), touching on issues such as the anti-trust effect of predatory pricing conspiracy; for treaty
interpretation, see, for example, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982),
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Fast forward two decades, the Chinese government has shown
analogous signs of self-confidence, especially after the global financial
crisis.85 Having spent years learning from the West, high-ranking Chinese
officials were suddenly awakened to the realization that “the teachers now
have some problems.”86 Further encouraged by its relative insulation from
the global recession, some in China now zealously advocate development
models that substantially depart from the Washington Consensus.87 And a
growing number of scholars have joined the enterprise of finding,
constructing and debating a Beijing Consensus.88
Whether Chinese investors set out to conquer the United States or
adapt to the U.S. “rules of the game” hinges very much on their perceptions
of the system. If confident about the efficacy of the Chinese ways of doing
business, managing companies, interacting with government officials, and
resolving disputes, Chinese investors will probably strive to maintain them,
which will cause friction with the extant U.S. system. Conversely, if the
Chinese investors view U.S. institutions positively, they should be less
inclined to maintain their traditional practices and more willing to make
necessary adjustments to satisfy the host environment. Part IV will provide
some empirical evidence on these important issues.
2. Ability to Adapt: Decision-Making Power and Local Knowledge
In addition to the “desire to adapt,” the actual adaptation of Chinese
investors to U.S. institutions also turns on their ability to do so, which I
contend is determined by: (1) the allocation of corporate decision-making
power, and (2) the access and use of professional knowledge.
Decision-making power is a critical factor because the Chinese
investors, as sole or majority shareholders, are legally entitled to making all

about the legal identity of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents and treaty benefits, and Taisei Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 535 (1995), clarifying the definition of permanent
establishment in U.S. tax treaties.
85
Barry Naughton, China’s Economy: Complacency, Crisis & The Challenge of Reform, 143
DAEDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 14, 14 (2014).
86
When Fortune Frowned, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.economist.com/
node/12373696.
87
Barry Naughton, China’s Distinctive System: Can it be a Model for Others?, 19 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 437, 437–40 (2010) [hereinafter Naughton, China’s Distinctive System].
88
For the debate about Beijing Consensus, see Suisheng Zhao, The China Model: Can it Replace
the Western Model of Modernization? 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 419, 419–36 (2010); Matt Ferchen, Whose
China Model is it Anyway? The Contentious Search for Consensus, 20 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 390,
391–96 (2013). For those who question the duplicability of the Beijing model, see Naughton, China’s
Distinctive System, supra note 87 at 437; Scott Kennedy, The Myth of the Beijing Consensus, 19 J.
CONTEMP. CHINA 461, 461–66 (2010). For those who argue against such a Beijing model, see Yang
Jiang, Rethinking the Beijing Consensus: How China Responds to Crises, 24 PACIFIC REV. 337, 337–50
(2011); Yasheng Huang, Rethinking the Beijing Consensus, 11 ASIA POL’Y 1, 11–24 (2011).
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major operation decisions regarding their U.S. investment.89 Because the
survey targets senior executives managing the U.S. businesses, we still need
to know their de facto decision-making power within the corporate structure
in order to connect the local desire to adapt (or lack thereof) with actual
adaptive behavior. For instance, a Chinese firm’s U.S. subsidiary may be
inclined to make adjustments, but its hands are tied if all calls are made by
the Chinese parent company that does not share the same aspirations.
Besides decision power allocation, the access and use of knowledge
requisite for adaptation serves as another important component of the
ability to adapt. The U.S. legal and regulatory systems are nothing but
complex; it normally takes years of training and practice to build expertise
in any field of U.S. law. Whether or not newly arrived Chinese investors
can access and use the indigenous professional knowledge is central to their
ability to adapt. This factor also relates to the allocation of corporate
decision-making power because only effective incorporation of professional
knowledge in U.S. operations will enable successful behavioral adaptation.
B. Are U.S. Institutions Vulnerable to Potential Threat from Chinese
Investment?
Another important yet under-explored factor in the debate about
Chinese business globalization and its implications is the level of
vulnerability of U.S. institutions when exposed to Chinese investment.
Though the U.S. government has been relatively open towards foreign
investment, over time it has put in place certain counter-threat institutional
measures.90 Whether the perceived threats of Chinese investors will
materialize, in case they refuse to adapt, depends to a great extent on the
adequacy of these protective measures. Yet because the study of these
measures—typically in the form of statutes and regulations—has been
dominated by legal scholars, their effects have not been adequately
addressed in the literature on Chinese business expansion. This article
analyzes these under-explored issues in light of the recent landmark case
Ralls v. CFIUS.
Moreover, the Chinese model of state capitalism may appear
formidable given the growing power of the Chinese government in
allocating resources and manipulating the market to achieve its policy
objectives. Yet it is possible, as contended by a few scholars, that the
Chinese model is as fragile as “Japan Inc.” and will eventually yield to the
U.S. variant of capitalism. This study will investigate these important
questions from an interdisciplinary perspective. Before proceeding to the
89

See infra Figure 6.
For example, the measures to protect against national security threats have been codified in the
CFIUS process. See infra Part VI.A for more details.
90
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detailed substantive analysis, however, the following Part III briefly
introduces the survey research, its administration, and the validity of the
survey results.
III. SURVEY DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION
As noted in Part I, the studies on Chinese companies investing in the
United States are limited in terms of methodology and scope. Most of the
empirical research has so far relied on case studies91 or publicly available
macro or firm-level data,92 causing potential biases in the findings that
weaken or even undercut the theories induced therefrom. Moreover, most
scholars focus on a narrow area of the debate, ignoring the apparent crossdisciplinary nature of the issues bearing on Chinese direct investment in the
United States. To fully assess their potential threats necessitates better
understanding of not only the Chinese companies, but also the U.S.
institutions exposed to the impact and the measures designed to prevent or
ameliorate critical threats.
As noted earlier, this Article fills the gaps by combining a
comprehensive survey of Chinese investors in the United States with the
analysis of relevant institutions such as the CFIUS review. This Part III
provides a brief description of the design, administration and validity of the
survey.
A. The Survey Design
The survey was conducted in 2014 by a major non-profit business
association of Chinese companies investing in the United States (the
“Association”). The Association was planning to publish a year-end white
paper and contemplated including some survey data. The author
participated as an independent academic advisor for the survey project, and
from time to time provided advice on the design and administration of the
survey and the analysis of its results. The author received no compensation
from the Association or any of its affiliated parties.
The survey includes 128 questions in sixteen sections, covering a
broad range of topics such as general business features of the responding
company and perceptions of the U.S. business, legal and political systems.93
91

Xiaohua Yang et al., Internationalization of Chinese and Korean Firms, 51 THUNDERBIRD INT’L
BUS. REV. 37, 38 (2009). For a few examples of such studies, see, for example, Yang et al., supra note
41, at 156; Deng, supra note 58, at 410.
92
See, e.g., Buckley et al., supra note 45, at 499; Ramasamy et al., supra note 45, at 18.
93
The sixteen sections include the following: (1) Basic Information of the Firm; (2) Information
about U.S. Business; (3) Trend of Business in the United States; (4) Evaluations on U.S. Business
Environment; (5) Challenges to the Company; (6) Mergers and Acquisitions; (7) Legal and Compliance;
(8) Dispute Resolution; (9) Human Resources; (10) Investment Protection; (11) National Security
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The questions originated from three major sources. First, a portion of them
were taken out of internal surveys from previous years.94 Second, some of
the questions were added to address the major issues currently confronting
Chinese firms that have already invested in the United States. Third,
additional questions were inserted pertaining to the long-term performance
of Chinese invested businesses and their interactions with U.S. institutions.
A pilot study of the survey was conducted in June to evaluate the draft
questions,95 and the subsequent revised draft was reviewed by an executive
director of the Association, whose comments were partially reflected in the
final version. To ensure truthfulness and accuracy, the survey was
conducted anonymously.96 The survey questionnaires were completed by
senior executives in management positions. Anticipating some of them to
speak less-than-perfect English, all of the survey questions were prepared in
simplified Chinese.
B. The Administration of the Survey
The survey questionnaires were distributed in multiple ways. First, to
ensure the responses derived from a diverse body of major Chinese
investors in the United States, the questionnaires were target-distributed to
all board members of the Association and its local chapters. Most of the
members completed and returned the survey by the end of August 2014.
Second, one of the executive directors of the Association conducted
interviews with a few dozen Chinese investors and requested the
interviewees to complete the survey questionnaires. Most of them timely
returned completed questionnaires.
The survey results were compiled by Association staff other than the
interviewing director. The director did not access the aggregated data, nor
was he informed about it, until the drafting of the white paper began. This
division of labor helped avoid possible feedback bias from the interviewer.
In addition, objectiveness and neutrality were emphasized repeatedly before
and during the survey process.
Third, approximately 200 surveys were mass-distributed to other
members of the Association. A staff of the Association kept track of the
Review and Anti-trust; (12) Tax; (13) Government Approval and Others; (14) Intellectual Property; (15)
Contributions to the United States; (16) About the Association. Another participant in the survey added
a few questions about intellectual property at the end of the survey after most of the results had been
received. These questions would not be included in this study.
94
Only about thirty responses were received from the last year’s survey. The results were only
published in an internal circulation.
95
The pilot study indicated that approximately thirty to forty minutes were needed to finish all of
the questions.
96
In addition, those who were concerned about confidentiality were instructed to simply skip any
question that made them uncomfortable.
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distribution and followed up with emails and phone calls to remind the
Chinese investors to complete the questionnaires, yet as expected, not many
responded.
C. Validity of the Survey Results
By October 2014, 101 responses had been received. Note that a
random sample of all Chinese companies investing in the United States was
not intended for the survey. For purposes of this study, the survey targeted a
diverse group of medium to large-sized Chinese investors whose business
expansion has significant or potentially significant impacts on the U.S.
market. A take-out restaurant in New York City owned and operated by a
Chinese family is not germane to this research, though a random sample of
Chinese investors in the United States will certainly include many such
small businesses. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that when
people debate about the threats of Chinese economic expansion, they have
in mind large multinational corporations, not Chinese-invested take-out
restaurants or laundromats, which certainly account for a large number of
Chinese investments in the United States.
The survey respondents comprise a diverse group of medium and
large-sized Chinese investors in the United States. Their diversity is assured
by the high response rate from the board members of the Association and its
local chapters, and the managers whom the director interviewed. The
Association’s practice has been to nominate sizable Chinese companies of
different sectors, locations, corporate structure, and ownership to lead the
board and the local chapters. As illustrated by the data below, the sample
exhibits a great diversity.
First, as shown in Figure 4, the respondents vary in terms of their
sectoral background. As many as seventeen reported to have business in the
auto industry. Thirteen of the respondents operate in construction and real
estate. The textile industry, closely followed by finance and energy, also
attracts sizable groups of Chinese investors. Eight respondents have
investments in both agriculture and information and electronic technology.97
In line with the general trend of FDI outflows from China, most of the
surveyed Chinese investors entered the U.S. market in the past decade. But
a sizable portion of the respondents started their investment twenty or thirty
years ago, which is attributable to the high percentage of SOEs in the
survey sample, as the Chinese government allowed only large central and
provincial trading companies to operate abroad before 1990.98

97
98
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Twenty-three respondents conduct business in a sector not specified in the survey.
Yang et al., supra note 41, at 138.
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Figure 4: Sectoral Distribution of Survey Respondents
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The survey respondents are diverse in terms of ownership character
(See Figure 5). 35% of the respondents reported their investors to be
completely private companies (with no state ownership). But stateownership is well represented; 27% of the respondents belong to Chinese
investors that are wholly owned by the Chinese government. Additionally,
23% report the state as the majority shareholder, and 7% have the state
owning less than 50% but more than 10%. The distribution of ownership
evidences the dominance of SOEs or their subsidiaries of Chinese FDI in
the United States in terms of value.99 The high percentage of SOEs in the
sample serves well the purposes of this study, as much of the debate about
Chinese investments concerns the outbound expansion of the state sector
and state capitalism.

99

SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 20, at 22.

165

36_1_3_LI SUPERFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

2/10/16 3:28 PM

36:143 (2016)

Figure 5: Ownership Structure of the Chinese Investors

In terms of ownership structure, the overwhelming majority of the
survey respondents are 100% owned by their Chinese investors, and another
12% of the respondents report Chinese investors owning the majority
interest (See Figure 6). It is worth emphasizing once again that the sample
does not constitute a random representation of all Chinese investments in
the United States, and portfolio investors are largely absent.100 Portfolio
investors that are passive holders of U.S. interests tend not to be vewied as
a critical threat, as evidenced by their exclusion from the national security
review of foreign acquisition of U.S. assets.101

100

Portfolio investment refers to the holding of interest or share of less than 10% of the invested

entity.

101

Part 800 - Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons,
31 C.F.R. § 800.302(b) (2016).
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Figure 6: Ownership Structure of the U.S. Investment

Moreover, the survey respondents hold investments in diverse
locations (See Figure 7). California stands out as the most popular state for
Chinese investors. New York, Michigan, New Jersey and Texas, in
decreasing order of popularity, also attract fair amounts of Chinese
investments. At least twelve other states each has a Chinese investor
responding to the survey.
Figure 7: Location Choice by Chinese Investors
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In sum, this study moves a major step forward by using a
comprehensive survey targeting medium and large-sized Chinese investors
in the United States that fall squarely under the spotlight of the ongoing
debate about China’s global business expansion and its implications. The
sample of respondents represents a diverse group, and various measures
were undertaken to ensure the objectiveness, accuracy, and truthfulness of
the survey results. That being said, a word of caution is in order.
Despite the care taken to ensure its quality, this survey cannot avoid
some of the problems common to all survey-based research. First, the
nonresponse problem from allowing respondents to skip questions that
made them uncomfortable, which essentially reflects the tradeoff between
receiving as many responses as possible and getting truthful but fewer
responses. The missing data inevitably have a biasing effect on the survey
results. Second, certain objective and subjective factors may systemically
affect how the respondents answer the questionnaires. For instance,
managers of SOE investments in the United States may intentionally or
subconsciously align their responses to the perceived dominant party line.
Such issues and their effect on the survey results will be discussed in more
detail when specific data are presented and analyzed in following Part IV.
IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY STUDY
Before proceeding to the in-depth discussion, this section begins with
a quick summary of the survey findings. First, preliminary results generally
support the view that China’s business expansion is unlikely to pose a
critical threat to U.S. institutions in the next decade. Most Chinese
companies appear to fall into Quadrant IV of the two-by-two matrix (See
Figure 3), and therefore are adapting to the host country environment and
are basically “playing our game.”102 To be more specific, the investors are
mostly motivated by commercial interests; they perceive the U.S. system
positively and are aware of their lack of local knowledge, so in adapting to
the new environment the Chinese investors rely heavily on professionals
and local talent. In contrast to Japanese companies that transplanted the
traditional business model to their U.S. investments in the 1980s,103 many
Chinese investors seem willing and ready to make necessary adjustments.
As a result, the Chinese investors act like their local competitors in the
sophisticated U.S. market and the complex U.S. regulatory system.

102

STEINFELD, supra note 5, at 18.
Yang et al., supra note 41, at 141; Eileen M. Mullen, Note, Rotating Japanese Managers in
American Subsidiaries of Japanese Firms: A Challenge for American Employment Discrimination Law,
45 STAN. L. REV. 725, 725–31 (1992).
103
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A. The Desire of Chinese Investors to Adapt to U.S. Institutions
1. Motives of Chinese Investment in the United States
As discussed in Part II, investment motives form a key part of the
desire to adapt. Are Chinese investments in the United States driven by
political concerns of the Chinese government or commercial interests of
profit-seeking enterprises? Investments motivated by Chinese state policies
and political factors are apparently more suspicious to U.S. policymakers.
Chinese SOEs, as well as private Chinese companies with colorable
government connections, inevitably draw heightened scrutiny when
venturing abroad. Illustrative examples include CNOOC’s failed bid for
UNOCAL and CFIUS’s demand for Huawei, a private Chinese company
founded by a former army engineer,104 to divest from 3Leaf, a U.S.
company whose core assets constitute patents worth merely $2 million.105
Presumably, Chinese investors closely following the government’s
order to “go global” would be less sensitive to the distinct features of U.S.
institutions and less inclined to adjust. By comparison, Chinese investors
attracted solely by the U.S. market and other business considerations should
respond to incentive mechanisms in ways similar to their American
competitors. Everything else being equal, they will desire to adapt as long
as doing so makes commercial sense. In other words, it is more likely for
the U.S. regulatory and legal frameworks to be effective in regulating
Chinese investors who share the same set of motives as domestic U.S.
companies, since they are mostly designed to shape the behavior of rational
business actors in a market economy.
Scholars are at odds on the investment motives of Chinese companies.
Some portray the Chinese government as a puppeteer pulling strings of
outbound investments.106 Under this account, investment decisions are
driven primarily by government policies, not by business concerns.107
Others, while acknowledging that the rather distinct state-business relations
in China may distort investment motives, contend that years of reforms
have, by and large, commercialized Chinese SOEs.108 Moreover, the lack of
104

David Barboza, China Telecom Giant, Thwarted in U.S. Deals, Seeks Inquiry to Clear Name,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/technology/26huawei.html.
105
Shayndi Raice & Andrew Dowell, Huawei Drops U.S. Deal Amid Opposition, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703407304576154121951088478.
106
For a summary of this camp of scholars, see J. M. F. Blanchard, Chinese MNCs as China’s New
Long March: A Review and Critique of the Western Literature, 16 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 91, 95 (2011).
107
See, e.g., Mark Yaolin Wang, The Motivations Behind China’s Government-Initiated Industrial
Investments Overseas, 75 PAC. AFF. 187, 189 (2002); SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 20, at 29.
108
See, e.g., STEINFELD, supra note 5, at 49–59; ERICA DOWNS, INSIDE CHINA, INC: CHINA
DEVELOPMENT BANK’S CROSS-BORDER ENERGY DEALS 2–5 (John L. Thornton China Ctr. at Brookings
Inst. 2011).
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effective central state control also contributes to corporate autonomy of the
SOEs’ foreign subsidiaries.109 Thus, one may infer that in spite of the
delicate balancing between state policy interests and corporate commercial
interests, most Chinese SOEs are profit-driven most of the time, resulting in
their mindful and keen adaptation to host country institutions.
This survey-based study adds a valuable empirical angle to this
ongoing debate. The preliminary survey results indicate Chinese investors
in the United States are mostly driven by commercial incentives. The
responding companies invested in the United States mainly for its huge
market, advanced technologies, and brand enhancement.110 Gaining control
over natural resources, the incentive that has received extensive
international media coverage, appears to play a negligible role in the
decisions to expand into the United States. Moreover, the finding does not
bear out the popular view that cash-rich Chinese investors are making
profligate acquisitions in the United States, given that only two survey
respondents invested in order to find an exit for surplus capital at home (See
Figure 8). In addition, two companies made investments to lower trade
costs. This differentiates Chinese investors from their Japanese counterparts
in the 1980s that were driven by, inter alia, trade conflicts and the forced
appreciation of yen.111

109

Antoine Kernen & Katy N. Lam, Workforce Localization among Chinese State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) in Ghana, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1053 (2014).
110
This is consistent with the findings from the studies of overall Chinese FDI. See, e.g., Agyenim
Boateng et al., Cross-Border M&As by Chinese Firms: An Analysis of Strategic Motives and
Performance, 50 THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 259, 259 (2008).
111
Young-Kwan Yoon, The Political Economy of Transition: Japanese Foreign Direct Investments
in the 1980s, WORLD POL., Oct. 1990, at 14. These companies were concentrated in certain sectors such
as steel and solar panel where significant trade barriers exist. Jean-Francois Hennart & Young-Ryeol
Park, Location, Governance, and Strategic Determinants of Japanese Manufacturing Investment in the
United States, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 419, 428–30 (1994).
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Figure 8: Motives for Investing in the United States
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Moreover, the survey results partially explain the clustering of Chinese
investment in the United States, a phenomenon previous studies have
largely overlooked.112 Twenty-three companies selected “meeting the needs
of current Chinese customers to grow in the United States” as a reason for
their entry into the U.S. market. Furthermore, the survey results do not
affirm the view that personal preferences of individual investors or senior
managers motivated business expansion in the United Sates, for only two
responding companies took the plunge due to the immigration intent of their
investors or managers.113 Though a large number of wealthy Chinese invest
in the United States to obtain permanent residency,114 most of these
112

One study notes that Chinese SOEs are unlike Japanese keiretsu in exhibiting the clustering
effect in FDI. See Yang et al., supra note 41, at 157.
113
They can do so through obtaining L1 visa or permanent residency via EB-5.
114
Alana Semuels, Should Congress Let Wealthy Foreigners Buy Green Cards? THE ATLANTIC
(Sep. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/should-congress-let-wealthy-
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investors keep their primary business in China,115 so their profiles did not
feature prominently in the survey.
Furthermore, the survey results shed light on the effect of the Chinese
government’s “go global” policies. As noted, China has been actively
promoting the expansion of Chinese companies abroad in the past decade.
Over time, it has adopted a series of policies to encourage outbound
investment, and several studies highlight the influence of such state
intervention.116 The survey results, however, indicate that the government’s
incentives play, at best, an indirect role in the Chinese companies’ decisions
to enter the U.S. market. To those Chinese investors that conducted M&A
in the United States, only seven selected Chinese government policy as
having influenced their decisions. Of course, the Chinese government
policies generally reflect the rationales listed in the survey, e.g., gaining
U.S. market share or famous brands,117 so these findings cannot rule out
indirect influence of the policies. But they certainly indicate that Beijing
either lacks the capacity of, or chooses to refrain from, micro-managing
cross-border business transactions of Chinese companies.118
Commercial motives are also evident in the investors’ location choice.
In response to the survey question, sixty picked “proximity to major
clients” as an important consideration. Thirty-one chose convenient
transportation as a key factor. Twenty-eight respondents considered the
location in big cities to be important for enhancing the investors’ global
profile. In addition, high quality employee pool, proximity to major
suppliers, and fine infrastructure were considered important by seventeen,
sixteen, and fifteen respondents respectively.
Indirectly, the commercial motivation of Chinese investments is also
evidenced by their profit rates. Unlike policy-driven investors that often
assume or tolerate higher losses, at least in the short term, the respondents
report profits comparable to those from their investments elsewhere. 38% of
the respondents found their U.S. profits to be on par with their global
foreigners-buy-citizenship/406432/; Frank Shyong, Visa Program for Wealthy Investors Maxed Out by
Chinese Demand, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-0830-chinese-visas20140830-story.html.
115
Id. (“Most of the people who want to do this are wealthy and they’re doing it for their kids”);
Zhongguo Yicheng Duoguo Zhuyao Yimin Laiyuanguo Disanbo Yiminchao Yonglai [China Became
Major Source of Immigrants for Several Countries, Arrives the Third Wave of Immigration]
(中国已成多国主要移民来源国 第三波移民潮涌来), CHINESE YOUTH (中国青年报) (Sept. 22,
2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-09/22/c_1112566061.htm.
116
Buckley et al., supra note 45; Quer et. al., supra note 46, at 1089; Alessia A. Amighini et al., Do
Chinese State-Owned and Private Enterprises Differ in their Internationalization Strategies? 27 CHINA
ECON. REV. 312, 320 (2013).
117
SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 20, 22–23.
118
Here, the issue of bias mentioned in Part III does not appear to be significant, because to stay in
line with the Chinese government’s policy, the respondents would have chosen “government policy” as
a major explanation for them to invest in the United States.
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profits. 25% reported U.S. profits higher than global profits, and the same
percentage of respondents had lower U.S. profits. In addition, 90% of the
respondents reported increasing or steady revenue in 2013, and about half
made even or a profit.119
The survey results also indicate that Chinese investments in the United
States will continue to grow. 33% of the companies ranked the U.S. market
as the top destination for their global investment for the near future, and
another 28% ranked it as a top three (See Figure 9). Only 6% companies
marked the United States as not an important investment destination. In
addition, most of the Chinese investors were satisfied with their U.S.
investment (only seven expressed dissatisfaction in the survey). Probably as
a result of self-selection, 76% of the respondents were optimistic about their
U.S. business in the next three to five years.
Figure 9: Ranking the United States in Short-Term Global Investment
Destinations

119

One may be concerned that the SOE managers systemically under or over-report their profit
levels in the United States. It is possible; but if it is indeed the case, we should observe a distribution of
the responses to be either left-skewed or right-skewed. Both distributions are of a normal shape,
suggesting that misreporting is not a systemic issue here.
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2. Perceptions of U.S. Business, Legal, and Political Institutions
Besides investment motives, perceptions should also play an important
role in determining Chinese investors’ desire to adapt to a host country’s
environment. Presumably, the investors will be more inclined to make
radical adjustments if they perceive U.S. institutions positively. As noted
earlier, the confidence of Japanese investors in their own business model
likely contributed to the reluctance to adapt in the 1980s.120 Similarly, the
Chinese ruling elites have demonstrated growing confidence, especially
after the global financial crisis.121 Do Chinese investors share the selfconfidence and therefore hesitate about adapting to U.S. institutions? The
survey results provide first-hand information on this important subjective
question that has been largely neglected in previous studies.
(a) The U.S. Social and Political System
Let us begin with how Chinese investors view the U.S. social and
political system. As noted earlier, several major events in the past few years
have had detrimental effect on the reputation of basic U.S. institutions. To
many, the global financial crisis revealed the flaws and dire consequences
of loose government regulations that reflected the deep-rooted faith in the
self-discipline and efficiency of free market capitalism.122 The subsequent
government intervention in economic restructuring at both the federal and
state level further justified the argument that government ought to play a
more proactive role in regulating the economy. Yet at the moment effective
governance became imperative, the world instead observed political
paralysis in Washington, D.C.123
The Chinese official media has not spared the United States of
negative publicity. American politics has been portrayed as conservative,
chaotic, and U.S.-centered,124 and as signaling the decay of Western
120
121

85.

See the discussion supra Part II.A.1.b.
Barry Naughton, China’s Economy: Complacency, Crisis & the Challenge of Reform, supra note

122

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT
(2009).
123
See, e.g., Palash Ghosh, Government Shutdown 2013: How Foreign Media Sees The Debacle in
Washington, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/government-shutdown-2013how-foreign-media-sees-debacle-washington-1425068; Keiko Ujikane, Biggest US Foreign Creditors
Show Concern on Default Risk, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-1008/japan-aso-warns-on-effect-of-any-u-s-default-on-reserves-value.html.
124
See, e.g., Meiguo Zhengfu Guanmen: Qiandaishang de Duikang (美国政府关门:
钱袋上的对抗) [American Government Shut Down, A Fight for Money], XIN JING BAO (新京报) (Oct.
19, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-10/19/c_117783388.htm; Meiguo Lianbang Zhengfu
Guanmen Fengbo Shuoming Shenmo (美国联邦政府关门风波说明什么？) [What Does the US
Government Shutdown Tell Us?] , GUANGMINGWANG (光明网) (Oct. 28, 2013),
INTO DEPRESSION
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democracy.125 At the same time, the state media advocates that the Chinese
system, characterized by political stability, social harmony, and sustained
economic development, provides a desirable alternative to the U.S.
institutions.126 The question pertinent to this study is whether Chinese
investors have internalized this rhetoric and become advocates and
practitioners of the Chinese model when they invest in the United States.
As demonstrated below, the survey findings indicate quite the
opposite. Chinese investors share highly positive views of U.S. social and
political systems. 75% of the respondents view the U.S. political system to
be stable or very stable, in contrast with only 2% who considered it to be
unstable.127 Likewise, on the question about social openness and
inclusiveness, only 2% expressed a negative view. The perception is even
more positive when it comes to social fairness, as merely 1% of the
respondents thought the United States to be an unfair society. In addition,
Chinese investors admire the United States for its capacity to innovate, with
95% of the respondents considering the society to be innovative or highly
innovative.128

http://www.gmw.cn/xueshu/2013-10/28/content_9305492.htm.
125
Touxi Meiguo Zhengfu Guanmen Fengbo (透析美国政府关门风波) [Analysis of American
Government Shutdown] , QIUSHILILUNWANG (求是理论网) (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.qstheory.cn/
zs/201310/t20131023_281996.htm.
126
Sun Tiexiang et al., Zhidu Zixin Zhigen Zhongguo (制度自信 植根中国) [Confidence in Chinese
Institutions],
XINHUANET (新华网) (Sept.
16,
2014),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/201409/16/c_1112498276.htm.; Xie Yahong et al., Hao Zhidu Rang Zhongguo Anding Youxu Chongman
Huoli (好制度让中国安定有序充满活力), [Good Institutions Stabilize and Energize China], PEOPLE’S
DAILY (Sept. 7, 2014), http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0907/c1002-25617441.html.
127
In a range of 1 to 5, 1 being very unstable, and 5 very stable, 98% chose 3 and above.
128
Here, systemic bias due to political concerns of the SOE managers, if any, would have been
reflected in more negative views of U.S. institutions, provided the Chinese government official rhetoric
desecrating the Western system. The survey results show quite the opposite.
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Figure 10: Perceptions of Extant US Institutions
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(b) The U.S. Business Environment
Chinese business environment differs from that of the United States. It
is conceivable that Chinese managers, having successfully built multinational enterprises large enough to invest in the United States, have gained
ample confidence in the efficacy of their time-honored way of doing
business, regardless of the context. If so, they would be reluctant to engage
in any substantial behavioral adjustment after investing in the United States
and continue to transact in the Chinese way. To address these questions, the
survey inquired about the Chinese investors’ perceptions of the U.S.
business environment.
Again, the Chinese investors expressed highly positive views. 91% of
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the respondents considered business transactions and conduct of American
firms to be transparent or highly transparent. The percentage is even higher
(94%) for the perception of Chinese investors about business ethics in the
United States. And on the question about compliance with the code of
business conduct, 98% of the respondents considered U.S. companies to be
in good standing.
Because the Chinese media occasionally portrayed the United States as
being hostile towards Chinese investors, citing cases such as CNOOC’s
failed bid for UNOCAL and the blockage of Huawei from the U.S. market,
the survey included several questions to assess the views of Chinese
investors on equality in U.S. business environment, i.e., no discriminatory
treatment of foreign companies, customers or investors. Only 5% of the
respondents felt unfairly treated, and 26% expressed a neutral view,
compared to 69% who saw the U.S. business environment to be equal or
highly equal.129
(c) The U.S. Legal System
Another major institutional difference between China and the United
States resides in judicial independence and authority. While in the United
States courts are recognized as a pillar of the political system separate and
independent of the legislature and the executive branches, courts in China
are heavily controlled by the party state.130 Hence, law enforcement in
China is often contingent on the power distribution of the stakeholders.131 In
response, Chinese firms rely more often on informal institutions such as
personal connections,132 and regulations and laws are frequently evaded,
neglected, or treated as mere costs of doing business.133
It is plausible that Chinese companies, when expanding abroad, carry
the attitude towards law and courts with them, as illustrated by anecdotal
reports of Chinese investors violating labor rights, disregarding
environmental protection law, and bribing officials.134 The issue is
129

Again, party line bias would have been reflected in more negative views. So the results suggest
that the bias, if any, is limited for this specific set of questions.
130
Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 THE CHINA Q. 620, 620 (2007);
Ji Li, Dare You Sue the Tax Collector? An Empirical Study of Tax-Related Administrative Lawsuits
Against Tax Agencies in China, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 57, 69 (2014).
131
Ji Li, Does Law Matter in China? An Empirical Study of a Limiting Case, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 119, 155–56 (2014).
132
Katherine K. Xin & Jone L. Pearce, Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal Institutional
Support, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1641, 1654 (1996).
133
See generally BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, REGULATING LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA:
LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT; THEORY AND CASES (2006).
134
Alfred Atakora et al., Globalization and Emergent Africa-Asia Dialogue: The Good, the Bad and
the Ugly, 7 AFR. J. BUS. MGMT. 3694, 3697 (2013); Angela Dziedzom Akorsu & Fang Lee Cooke,
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important for understanding their adaptation, as the reading of U.S. law and
courts to be corrupt or systemically biased will presumably affect the
investors’ compliance inclination.
The survey included a number of questions addressing this issue.
Unsurprisingly, many respondents considered formal U.S. laws to be
complex and confusing (29%). But the perception does not appear to affect
the generally positive view held by the Chinese investors about the
sensibility of U.S. law. We asked their opinions about U.S. tax law, well
known to be the most complex substantive law, in comparison to Chinese
tax law. Only 2% of the respondents considered U.S. tax law to be more
unreasonable than Chinese tax rules. Though the majority held a neutral
view, 46% of the respondents thought U.S. tax law to be more reasonable.
This result is remarkable considering that only 3% of the respondents
thought U.S. tax burden to be less than in China and 63% considered their
U.S. tax liabilities to be either heavier or much heavier than their Chinese
taxes.
While Chinese firms tend to distrust the courts and arrange their
business under informal institutions135 or use biased judges to gain favors,136
those that have invested in the United States shared a generally positive
view of the U.S. judiciary. 51% of the respondents considered U.S. courts
to be fair or very fair. 46% held neutral opinions and merely 3% of the
respondents saw U.S. courts as unfair.
In strong contrast to the favorable views of U.S. business, political and
legal environments, the respondents reacted negatively to questions about
several specific issues. Only 11% of the Chinese investors considered the
enforcement of anti-dumping and countervailing duty rules to be
reasonable. 46% of the respondents were neutral, and 42% considered them
unreasonable or highly unreasonable. On the question about CFIUS review,
43% of Chinese companies expressed lack of knowledge, and 43%
considered the process to be politically charged. Only 13% expressed a
positive view. These results are probably reactions to the highly arbitrary
nature of these measures.137 On the attitude of U.S. Congress towards
Chinese companies and products, 30% of the respondents chose “unfair” or
“highly unfair”, 53% held a neutral view, and merely 16% expressed
positive opinions.
Labour Standards Application among Chinese and Indian Firms in Ghana: Typical or Atypical? 22
INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. 2730, 2730 (2011).
135
Katherine K. Xin & Jone L. Pearce, Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal Institutional
Support, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1641, 1641–42 (1996).
136
Yuen Yuen Ang & Nan Jia, Perverse Complementarity: Political Connections and the Use of
Courts among Private Firms in China, 76 J. POL. 318, 318 (2014).
137
For the arbitrariness of U.S. antidumping measures, see Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s
Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 2 (2012). For more discussion about the CFIUS review process,
see infra Part VI.A.
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Such relatively negative views, however, do not reflect the general
impression of Chinese investors about public administration in the United
States. When asked to compare government review and approval
procedures of the United States with China, 60% of the respondents found
the burden to be less in the United States, and only 12% considered the
procedures to be slightly more cumbersome. Moreover, 66% of the Chinese
investors considered the procedures in the United States to be more
transparent than in China, on which only 5% disagreed. Moreover, negative
perceptions of the federal agencies and procedures are not unique for the
Chinese investors; American public shares similar views. Most would
endorse the fundamental political regime but be critical about the
administration, especially at the federal level.138
In sum, despite its relative economic decline, the United States still
enjoys enormous “soft power,” a term coined by Joseph Nye to mean the
ability of a country to “get other countries to want what it wants.”139 The
survey results demonstrates that commercially-motivated Chinese investors
perceive the U.S. political, business, and legal systems positively, which
sets the stage for quick adaptation of Chinese companies to the U.S. “rules
of the game.” Part V will elaborate with more details of the actual
adaptation.
B. The Ability to Adapt to U.S. Institutions
The second variable for investment adaptation is the ability to adapt.
As noted earlier, the ability to adapt varies in accordance with the allocation
of decision-making power in the investor’s corporate structure, and the
access and use of knowledge requisite for adaptation.
1. The Allocation of Decision-Making Power
As noted, 68% of the respondents reported that their Chinese investors
held 100% of the interests in the U.S. investment, and another 11% held
less than 100% but more than 50% of the interests in the U.S. business (See
Figure 6). Only 6% held minority interests. The majority ownership should
entitle the Chinese parents to absolute legal control over the operation of
their U.S. subsidiaries. Yet on the other hand, it will be costly and
inefficient for the Chinese investors to dictate their U.S. operations given
the differences between the two markets. For our study, the decisionmaking power allocation is important because decisions of the Chinese
138

A recent survey indicates that only 24% of American citizens trust the federal government. See
Public Trust in Government: 1958–2014, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.peoplepress.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/.
139
Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL’Y 153, 166 (1990).
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parents presumably reflect more of the Chinese political, business, and legal
contexts, not the desire of the local subsidiaries, if any, to adapt to U.S.
institutions.140
Since it is difficult to gauge accurately how decision-making power (a
broad and nebulous term) is allocated between the executives of the
Chinese parents and their U.S. subsidiaries or branches, this study focuses
on a proxy variable, i.e., the specific power to decide on important
personnel matters concerning the U.S. operations that is at the center of
corporate management power. 13% of the Chinese respondents reported
that their parent Chinese companies made all-important personnel decisions
for the U.S. business. And another 33% reported that the Chinese
headquarters made the decisions, but based on consultation with local
managers. Among the rest, in 34% of the cases the local managers made the
personnel decisions for the U.S. business, after consulting with the Chinese
headquarters, and 17% reported the U.S. managers to have full authority
over personnel decisions for the U.S. operation. In a nutshell, the odds favor
the executives stationed in the United States to decide key issues
concerning the U.S. investments, though the gap is rather small (51% v.
46%).141 In addition, unlike the rank-and-file staff expatriated from China,
the managers are normally assigned to work long-term in the United States.
Many expect to stay for longer than five years.142
To sum up this subsection, though the ownership structure of most
Chinese companies in the United States is such that their Chinese parents
could wield absolute control over the operation of their U.S. investments, in
practice the local managers sharing the positive outlook of U.S. institutions
are often the decision-makers, and their interests should be better aligned
with the performance of the U.S. investments given their relatively longterm assignment.
2. Access and Use of Knowledge and Skills Requisite for
Adaptation
Another factor that determines the ability to adapt is access and use of
local and professional knowledge about the U.S. institutions. Without it
Chinese investors inclined to adapt cannot succeed given the significant
differences between the two countries. Companies that have been
accustomed to lax enforcement of law in China face formidable challenges
140

A recent empirical study of Chinese companies investing in Germany found no rigid rules
regarding the allocation of decision-making power between Chinese parents and their German
subsidiaries. See Yun Schüler-Zhou & Margot Schüller, An Empirical Study of Chinese Subsidiaries’
Decision-Making Autonomy in Germany, 12 ASIAN BUS. & MGMT. 321, 321 (2013).
141
2% chose the other option, probably indicating a fully consensus-based decision-making
procedure involving both the Chinese headquarter and the U.S. operation.
142
This is in accordance with the survey data.
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adapting to the more sophisticated and stringent U.S. regulatory and legal
environment. One way to overcome such barriers is by forming a joint
venture with U.S. parties. An earlier study of Chinese multinational
corporations in general found the method to be highly popular, with 79%
operating abroad through joint ventures.143 However, Chinese companies
investing in the United States strongly prefer the use of subsidiaries (See
Figure 6). Without a local partner, these investors have to rely on internal
and external professionals to overcome the knowledge and skill gap.
The survey results show a high ratio of respondents with full-time inhouse counsel. 32% reported to have in-house counsel who was a licensed
lawyer, whereas 12% had in-house counsel who did not pass any bar.
Another 16% of the respondents did not yet have an in-house counsel, but
were planning to hire one. So in total 60% of the respondents had full-time
staff to oversee the legal matters of their investments in the United States.
Besides law, regulatory compliance is also an area that sets China
apart from the United States. It is reasonable to suspect that Chinese
investors, given their records in China,144 may demonstrate compliance
weakness in the United States. The survey results, however, present
preliminary evidence of the opposite. 27% of the respondents reported to
have full-time staff in charge of compliance work. Another 18% had their
in-house counsel handle compliance. And 18% of the Chinese investors did
not currently have any full-time employee for compliance, but were
planning to hire one. Thus, only 36% of the respondents neither had nor
intended to add such a position.
Moreover, according to the survey findings in-house professionals
were entrusted with significant authority. For Chinese companies that had
in-house counsel, we inquired about the importance of their advice for
management decision-making. 67% of the respondents answered
“important” or “very important”. Only 4% thought in-house counsel
opinions unimportant. Likewise, on the influence of the opinions of
compliance officers, 71% of the respondents chose “important” or “very
important,” and only 4% thought the opposite.
Given the complexity of the U.S. law, in-house counsel or compliance
staff can hardly handle all the matters that may legally implicate the
Chinese investors. Does the reliance on professionals reach outside the
firms? The survey findings again answer in the positive. 65% of the
143

Yang et al., supra note 41, at 152.
For discussion about Chinese companies’ lack of compliance with labor law, see, for example,
SEAN COONEY ET AL., LAW AND FAIR WORK IN CHINA 133–34 (2013). For discussion about compliance
with environmental protection law, see, for example, Benjamin Van Rooij, Regulating Land and
Pollution at Lake Dianchi: Compliance and Enforcement in a Chinese and Comparative Perspective, in
MATTIAS BURELL & MARINA SVENSSON, MAKING LAW WORK: CHINESE LAWS IN CONTEXT 374–76
(2010).
144
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respondents frequently engaged American lawyers and 33% had
occasionally used their service, which leaves only 2% to have never used a
U.S. lawyer. In choosing a U.S. lawyer, the Chinese investors paid the most
attention to the lawyer’s practice experience in relevant areas, followed by
legal fee and the lawyer or law firm’s general reputation. Only a few paid
attention to the lawyer’s government connections or Chinese background,
and even fewer cared about the lawyer’s educational background. These
results indicate a rather sophisticated understanding by Chinese investors of
the U.S. market for legal service. Factors that may be more important in
China, e.g., good government connections, are not highly valued by most
Chinese investors in the United States.
In addition, the overall perception of the legal services provided by
American lawyers appears positive. When asked to rate the level of
satisfaction with the work of American lawyers on a one to five scale (one
being very unsatisfied, five being very satisfied), 55% chose four and 9%
chose five. Only 3% chose two, and no one chose one. Judging from such
feedback, Chinese investors will continue to rely on U.S. lawyers while
adapting to U.S. institutions.145
The survey also indicates that, analogous to in-house counsel and
compliance officers, U.S. lawyers play a major part in the decision-making
of Chinese investors. On the role of professional legal advice in their
investment or purchase decisions in the United States, 45% of the
respondents reported to have consulted American lawyers prior to making
their decisions, and the legal advice played an important role. 34%
consulted U.S. lawyers prior to the decision, and the legal advice was used
as a reference. 11% consulted U.S. lawyers after the decision, but
considered their advice to be important, in comparison to 5% who acquired
a legal opinion after the decision and used it as a reference. Only 5% of the
respondents never consulted a U.S. lawyer in making the decision.
When asked why U.S. lawyers would not be consulted, “high legal
cost” was the most cited reason, followed by “lack of reliable American
lawyers.” Cultural reasons such as the “fear of signaling hostility or lack of
trust” that characterize Chinese dispute resolution did not seem to matter
much.146 Only one Chinese investor chose not to consult any U.S. lawyer to
avoid sending the signal, and two decided not to engage lawyers because
they transacted with acquaintances.
In sum, the generally positive perceptions of the U.S. political,
business, and legal systems, combined with the allocation of decision-

145

This should also be a result of selection. Companies presumably engage those lawyers on
repeated basis whose service is considered satisfactory.
146
Ji Li, Interactions between Domestic Social Norms and International Law over Trade Dispute
Resolution, in THE RULE OF LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS: CONTESTATIONS
AND DEFERENCE (Machiko Kanetake & Andraé Nollkaemper eds.) (forthcoming).
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making power favoring executives stationed in the United States, the
alliance of their interests with investment performance, and the heavy
reliance on U.S. professionals and local talent set a favorable tone for
prompt adaptation of Chinese investors to the host country environment.
Yet caution should be exercised before drawing a definitive conclusion
that adaptive Chinese investors would not pose a critical threat to extant
U.S. institutions. First, the theory may not have exhausted all relevant
factors determining the adaptation of Chinese investors in the United States.
Thus, it is possible that due to some omitted variables adaptation does not
occur, or occurs slowly or in a non-linear fashion. Second, the findings
about the ability to adapt present a mixed picture. Nearly half of the
respondents reported the Chinese headquarters calling the shots about their
U.S. operation. It is less clear whether these investors will respond to U.S.
institutions in the same way as those locally managed. Additionally, much
of the threat-no-threat question also depends on available preventive and
remedial measures. Even if a fraction of Chinese investors fail to adapt,
they may not pose an immediate threat provided the U.S. institutions are
equipped with effective defense mechanisms.
Taking these issues into account, the following Part V conducts an indepth case study of Chinese investors’ adaptation to U.S. institutions on
employment discrimination. Part VI then explores two much-debated
threats from Chinese business expansion in the United States, the threat to
national security and the threat of the Chinese variant of state capitalism to
the U.S. model of free market capitalism. In addition to evaluating the
general finding of Chinese investors’ adaptation and investigating their
potential threats, I choose these topics also because, despite the underlying
theoretical and practical importance, their empirical analysis has been
lacking.
V. AN IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF CHINESE INVESTORS’
ADAPTATION TO U.S. INSTITUTIONS
The survey data discussed in Part IV portray most Chinese investors as
inclined and able to adapt to U.S. institutions. The findings, however, are
not definitive, especially given possible biases and the roughly balanced
allocation of decision-making power between the Chinese investors and
their U.S. managers. This Part V further explores the adaptation (or lack
thereof), in the area of employment discrimination.
The area of labor rights protection has fueled much doubt and
resentment about Chinese business globalization. To better analyze the
adaptation of Chinese investors, the study focuses on the subtle and
complex issue of employment discrimination, as big gaps exist between the
two countries in this particular area. In addition, employment protection is
more germane to Chinese companies investing in the United States than
183
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other controversial areas such as environmental protection or product safety
because many Chinese investors operate in the service sector (See Figure
4). Commercial banks, for instance, neither produce poisoned pet food nor
pollute the rivers. But every Chinese investor in the United States, be it
large or small, operates with a work force, so all should comply with U.S.
rules prohibiting employment discrimination. Using the survey data, this
subsection analyzes the adaptation (or lack thereof) of Chinese investors by
investigating their employment practices.
Before proceeding to the analysis, a brief introduction of Chinese labor
law regime follows as a necessary background. The dramatic transformation
of China from a Soviet-style planned economy to state capitalism with a
rather dynamic market drove the legislation of employment-related statutes
in China. In the former system most workers were employees of the state
and employment-related disputes could be internally resolved by their work
units.147 Once some were shoveled onto the market, their rights had to be
protected by law. In response the Chinese legislature enacted a series of
statutes for that purpose over time.
The PRC Labor Law, effective in 1995, set forth the basic legal rights
of employees. Subsequent enforcement of the statute, however, failed to
meet the high expectations as rampant violations and abuses of labor rights
persisted.148 Reacting to workforce discontent and to ease social tensions,
the legislature passed additional employment-related laws.149 Employment
Contract Law (2007), for example, reallocated the legal rights and
obligations between employers and employees in favor of the latter.150 And
non-judicial channels for resolving employment-related disputes were
reinforced by the Law on the Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Dispute
(2008).
The legislature also enacted the Employment Promotion Law, which
took effect in January 2008.151 The highly progressive statute provided
formal legal basis for eliminating many types of employment discrimination
in China. Articles 28 and 29 of the statute encourage the hiring of ethnic
minorities and people with disabilities.152 Article 30 prohibits
discrimination against pathogen carriers of infectious diseases such as HIV
147

Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 1284, 1330 (1967).
148
Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in
The People’s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050, 1060 (2007).
149
Virginia E. Happer Ho, From Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation under
China’s New Labor Legislation, 23 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 35, 39 (2009).
150
Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China’s Labor Law: Goals, Processes, Outcomes,
30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 373, 386 (2008).
151
Zonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye Cujin Fa (中华人民共和国就业促进法) [P.R.C. Law on
Employment Promotion] (promulgated Aug. 30, 2007 by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
effective Jan 1, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/31/content_732597.htm.
152
Id.
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or hepatitis B; Article 31 provides equal treatment for both urban workers
and those migrating from rural areas.153
Another important employment-related law in China is the Labor
Union Law (2001). All Chinese unions belong to the All-China Federation
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), and no independent union organizations are
allowed under the law.154 Operating under the party’s direct leadership, the
ACFTU has to keep a delicate balance between serving the interests of
employers, which include powerful SOEs and multinational corporations
critical to local and national GDP growth, and protecting the workers,
whose dissatisfaction may lead to social discontent and instability.
While the Chinese laws in the books, after years of active legislation,
resemble those of a well-developed civil law country with sophisticated
legal protection of labor rights,155 their enforcement in practice remains
problematic.156 Despite the general demographic changes in China that
resulted in the reversal of the huge labor surplus in the 1990s and caused a
labor “famine,”157 various types of employment-related discrimination
continue to plague the Chinese workplace.158
Having been accustomed to such a domestic context of employment
regulation, Chinese companies investing abroad may not prioritize the
protection of workers’ rights in their host countries, as evidenced by
anecdotal reports about labor abuses such as underpayment, long working
hours, and discrimination committed by Chinese investors in developing
countries.159 And it is not unreasonable to speculate that Chinese
companies, when investing in the United States, will fall short of fully
complying with the sophisticated legal regime for employment protection,
especially the subtle and intricate rules prohibiting discrimination. Again,
Japanese companies investing in the United States may serve as an
illustrative example.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the United States was the top FDI
destination for Japanese companies.160 Japan is known for its homogeneous
153

Id.
Ho, supra note 149, at 59.
155
OECD ranked China highly in terms of employment protection legislation. See OECD, OECD
INDICATORS ON EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION (2013), http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/EPLdata2013.xlsx.
156
Ho, supra note 149, at 39.
157
Id. at 88.
158
Timothy Webster, Ambivalence and Activism: Employment Discrimination in China, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 643, 660–62 (2011).
159
See, e.g., Simon Clark et al., China Lets Child Workers Die Digging in Congo Mines for Copper,
BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aW8xVLQ4Xhr8.
160
For instance, in 1991 43% of all Japanese outflow investment ended in the U.S. See Schon
Beechler & Zhuang Yang John, The Transfer of Japanese-Style Management to American Subsidiaries:
Contingencies, Constraints, and Competencies, 25 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 467, 468 (1994).
154
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culture that to a certain extent tolerates discrimination based on gender, age,
nationality and race.161 Arriving from such a cultural and business
environment, Japanese companies investing in the United States were
frequently sued by employees.162 In response to the clash between their
traditional employment practice and the U.S. laws against discrimination,
Japanese firms had adopted a variety of tactics, from taking advantage of
treaty exemptions163 to using secretive communication code to screen job
applicants according to their race, age, and national origin.164
Now enter the Chinese investors. Will the Chinese companies bring to
the United States the substandard employment practices and various forms
of discrimination they have been accustomed to while operating in China?
Before analyzing the survey results pertinent to this question, it is important
to note that the U.S. legal context in which Chinese investors operate varies
from the one for Japanese companies. Of the most importance for
employment discrimination is the lack of a bilateral treaty similar to the
Japan-U.S. Friendship Commerce and Navigation Treaty, which contains a
provision granting Japanese companies investing in the United States great
autonomy in filling executive positions.165
Such a favorable treaty does not exist between the United States and
China. Thus, all Chinese companies investing in the United States,
regardless of their form, are bound by the entire U.S. legal framework for
employment protection. Given the general findings in Part IV, i.e., Chinese
investors’ positive perceptions of the U.S. systems, their commercial
motives, the heavy reliance on local talent and U.S. professionals, one may
reasonably expect Chinese investors to adapt quickly to the host country
environment in terms of their employment practices.166 As noted below, the
survey findings largely confirm this expectation.
According to the survey, high labor cost tops the list of challenges
faced by Chinese investors. Due to the development gap between the two
countries, U.S. salaries are much higher than the salaries of Chinese
161

Linda N. Edwards, Equal Employment Opportunity in Japan: A View from the West, 41 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 240 (1988).
162
John M. Mezias, Identifying Liabilities of Foreignness and Strategies to Minimize their Effects:
The Case of Labor Lawsuit Judgments in the United States, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 229, 239–40
(2002).
163
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 179 (U.S. 1982).
164
Employment Discrimination by Japanese-Owned Companies in the United States: Before the
Subcomm. On Employment and Housing of the H. Comm. On Government Operations, 102nd Cong. 7–9
(1992) (statement of Paul Schmidtberger, former employee, Recruit U.S.A.).
165
See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 457 U.S. at 181 (quoting Article VIII(1) of the treaty, which
provides that “companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other
party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other
specialists of their choice.” Yet “US subsidiaries of Japanese companies do not enjoy the treaty
benefits”).
166
See supra Part IV.
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workers. For those Chinese firms that have hired local workers, the top
three reasons are “for gaining access to U.S. market,” “for communicating
with customers,” and “general knowledge of U.S. culture and market.”
Given the market-seeking objective of most Chinese investors (see Figure
8) it is rational to rely heavily on local talent, despite the concern of higher
cost.
As to the profiles of the U.S. employees, only 14% reported to hire
mainly Chinese Americans; the vast majority 85% reported a U.S.
workforce of racial and ethnic diversity. The Chinese investors also
reported to be mostly satisfied with the performance of their U.S.
employees. Only 5% of the respondents were less satisfied, compared to
50% who were satisfied, and 10% who were very satisfied. 18% of the
respondents expressed a neutral view. These figures are comparable to the
satisfaction level for employees expatriated from China, which indicates
that Chinese investors will likely increase the hiring of local employees as
the cost of Chinese labor continues to rise. The high satisfaction with the
diverse U.S. workforce also suggests Chinese firms in the United States are
less prone to discrimination on race, ethnicity or national origin.
There also exists more direct evidence in support of this conclusion.
Since it is impractical to ask explicitly whether the respondents engage in
employment discrimination, the survey instead inquired into the preventive
measures taken by the Chinese investors. 167 Only 11% of the respondents
reported to have not taken any measure to prevent employment
discrimination. 19% had orally advised their employees against
discrimination. 43% of the respondents adopted formal internal rules
against discrimination and 27% not only had formal rules, but also provided
training to their employees preventing employment discrimination, which is
comparable to the percentage reported in a survey of American
organizations.168
While we cannot observe directly the extent of discrimination in the
Chinese-invested firms, survey results indicate that employment
discrimination has not been a major issue. 83% of the respondents reported
to have received no employee complaint about discrimination. 8% reported
to have handled such complaints through settlement. Only 4% had litigated
discrimination complaints from employees.169
167

See supra Part IV.
31% of the surveyed American companies reported to have provided diversity training in 2012.
See SOC’Y HUM. RES. MGMT., SHRM SURVEY FINDINGS: DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION 17 (2014),
http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/shrm/shrm-2013-survey-findings-diversity-inclusion-v534003340/2. Among the American organizations with fewer than 500 employees, only 21% reported to
have provided diversity training in 2012. Id. at 8. Given that few Chinese investors in the U.S. have a
staff of more than 500 employees, we can infer that a Chinese company investing in the U.S. is more
likely than an American organization to offer training preventing employment discrimination.
169
One may suspect underreporting. It is possible, but should not be a serious problem given the
168
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In sum, general data reported in Part IV suggest that Chinese
companies investing in the United States are driven by commercial
incentives, perceive positively of the U.S. institutions, and rely heavily on
local and professional talent. Thus, they should be adaptive to the host
country’s legal and regulatory systems. This Part VI presents further
empirical support to the argument. Survey data about employment practices
indicate that, despite anecdotal reports critical of Chinese outward investors
for violating labor rights in certain developing countries, those investing in
the United States have adapted relatively well to the sophisticated U.S. legal
and regulatory environment for employee protection.170
VI. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF TWO POTENTIAL THREATS OF
CHINESE BUSINESS EXPANSION
Even if empirically affirmed, however, the general tendency of
adaptation shall not obscure the potential threats from deviant cases or
groups of outliers. Thus, this article will also analyze the adequacy of extant
U.S. institutions to protect against the risk of Chinese investment.
Furthermore, Part VI.B resumes the discussion of the Chinese model of
state capitalism and, drawing on the unique survey data, questions the claim
that it may pose formidable challenges to the U.S. variant of capitalism.
A. The CFIUS Review and the Ralls Decision
This subsection discusses the legal framework for the CFIUS review
process and its recent development subsequent to the D.C. Circuit decision
in Ralls v. CFIUS, which held the committee’s treatment of a Chinese
investment case violated the investor’s constitutional right to due process.171
As will be illustrated, the CFIUS review has over time been strengthened
and despite the setback in Ralls, will remain a powerful institution to
prevent and mitigate threats to U.S. national security by Chinese investors
that are inadequately addressed by other laws.
Originally created in 1975 by an executive order, CFIUS was initially
charged with monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United
States and coordinating relevant government policies.172 In response to the
surge of FDI from Japan and other foreign countries, Congress enacted the
“Exon-Florio Amendment” in 1988 to Title VII of the Defense Production
Act of 1950, which empowered CFIUS to assist the President in reviewing

anonymity of the survey and the Association’s independent third-party status.
170
The adaptation may also be partially attributable to the development gap between China and the
U.S. and lack of favorable treaty exemptions.
171
Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS, 758 F.3d 296, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
172
Georgiev, supra note 83, at 126.
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and blocking foreign investment considered to pose national security
threats.173 CFIUS, led by the Department of Treasury, consists of nine
member agencies and invites several others to observe.174 Later, a few highprofile acquisition attempts by foreign investors led to the passage of the
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), which
amended and codified the CFIUS review process to provide more
transparency and Congressional oversight.175
Filing for CFIUS review is voluntary.176 Once a filing is completed,
CFIUS has thirty days to review and approve the investment or otherwise
initiate a forty-five day investigation.177 Any CFIUS agency can initiate the
investigation.178 At the expiration of the forty-five day period, unresolved
issues will be submitted to the President, who must either approve or block
the transaction within fifteen days.179 The filing party may withdraw its case
or re-file, which restarts the clock. CFIUS review is limited to covered
transactions, which broadly refer to “any merger, acquisition, or takeover . .
. by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control of any
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.”180
The law fails to clearly define “national security,” but provides a nonexhaustive list of factors for making that determination, including
investment that impacts “domestic production needed for . . . national
defense,” “Untied States critical technologies,” “long-term requirements for
. . . critical resources,” and “critical infrastructure.”181 Some had proposed
to include “economic security” to the jurisdiction of CFIUS, but the term
did not find its way into the statute or subsequent regulations.182 Although
the filing is voluntary, CFIUS constitutes a powerful tool to regulate foreign
investment in the United States as it can order divestiture of U.S. assets
whenever a threat to national security is determined.183 In addition, FINSA
173

Marc Greidinger, The Exon-Florio Amendment: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 6 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 111, 112–14 (1991).
174
Composition of CFIUS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx.
175
Margaret Merrill, Overcoming CFIUS Jitters: A Practical Guide for Understanding the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 6 (2011).
176
31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a) (2011).
177
31 C.F.R. §§ 800.502–505 (2011); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(2)(C) (2006).
178
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(A) (2006).
179
31 C.F.R. § 800.506(b)(l)–(3) (2011); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (2006).
180
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3) (2006).
181
Id. § 2170(f).
182
Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73 Fed.
Reg. 70702, 70705 (Nov. 21, 2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800), http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUS-Final-Regulations-new.pdf (indicating §
800.801 was drafted narrowly in line with CFIUS’s intent to focus “on genuine national security
concerns alone, not broader economic or other national interests.”).
183
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(3) (2006).
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mandates an investigation of any foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets if such
acquisition will result in foreign government control.184 Furthermore,
adding to the uncertainties of foreign investment in the United States,
CFIUS is not time-barred from opening a review of a covered
transaction,185 and the actions and findings of the President through CFIUS
review are not subject to judicial review.186
From 2008 to 2012, 538 notices were filed,187 mostly by companies
from countries that are considered U.S. allies. The U.K. topped the ranking
of source countries until 2012, when it was overtaken by China (See Figure
11.) CFIUS rarely rejected properly notified transactions, though it had
persuaded some foreign investors to voluntary withdraw from their
proposed investment.188 The regime is of particular relevance to Chinese
investors as a higher percentage of Chinese companies are state controlled,
and FINSA mandates CFIUS investigations of acquisitions resulting in
foreign government control.189
The CFIUS review process and its outcome is shrouded in
uncertainties,190 yet for decades no foreign investor had challenged a CFIUS
action in court, probably because of the relatively loose enforcement prior
to FINSA,191 the underlying national security nature of the process, and the
statutory provision clearly constraining judicial review.192 That record,
however, was recently shattered by a Chinese investor.

184

Id. § 2170(b)(1)(B).
Andreas Heinemann, Government Control of Cross-Border M&A: Legitimate Regulation Or
Protectionism? 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 843, 844 (2012).
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50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (2006).
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Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions 2008–2012, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreigninvestment/Documents/CFIUS%20Stats%202008-2012.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
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50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(B) (2006).
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See, e.g., Christopher M. Tipler, Defining ‘National Security’: Resolving Ambiguity in the CFIUS
Regulations, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1223, 1243 (2014); Joshua C. Zive, Unreasonable Delays: CFIUS
Reviews of Energy Transactions, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 169, 169 (2013).
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David Zaring, CFIUS As Congressional Notification Service, 83 S.C. L. REV. 81, 87 (2009).
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Figure 11: Number of Covered Transactions by Acquirer Home Country
(2006–2013)
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Data source: Annual Reports to Congress (2008–2015) by Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-reports.aspx

In March 2012, Ralls Corporation, a U.S. company owned by two
Chinese nationals, purchased four American companies with the intent to
develop windfarms in north-central Oregon.193 The purchased sites are
located in and around the “region of a restricted airspace and bombing zone
maintained by the United States Navy.”194 After reviewing Ralls’s filing
made post to the transaction at the request of the Defense Department,
CFIUS determined that the acquisition threatened national security and
issued interim mitigation orders restricting Ralls’s access to, and preventing
further construction at, the windfarm sites pending the President’s final
decision.195 The matter was then submitted to President Obama, who
concurred that the transaction posed a national security threat and issued an
order blocking the transaction and requiring Ralls, among others, to divest
from the American companies.196
Throughout the CFIUS review process, Ralls received no explanation
as to the factual basis of the determination and was provided no opportunity
to rebut any evidence against it.197 In response to the CFIUS actions, Ralls
filed a lawsuit claiming, inter alia, the violation by CFIUS of its due process
193

Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 304.
195
Id. at 302.
196
Id. at 306.
197
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right under the Fifth Amendment.198 The district court initially dismissed
most of Ralls’s claims as moot or for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.199
Later the due process claim was also dismissed for failure to state a
claim.200 Ralls appealed, and the D.C. Circuit surprisingly reversed.201
The D.C. Circuit began by applying the “clear-and-convincing
evidence” standard to avail itself of jurisdiction to review the constitutional
due process claims and observed that the statutory bar under the Defense
Production Act of 1950 applied only to the President’s determinations, not
the constitutionality of the process by which they are reached.202 Moreover,
it rejected the appellee’s argument that Ralls’s procedural due process claim
was a nonjusticiable political question as the claim did not “encroach on the
prerogative of the political branches,” “did not require the exercise of nonjudicial discretion,” and was “susceptible to judicially manageable
standards.”203 After the review, the D.C. Circuit found Ralls was denied due
process as it was neither informed of the nature of the national security
concern with the acquisitions or the evidence on which the determination
was based, nor allowed an opportunity to rebut the evidence.204
In post-brief proceedings the government also raised the defense of
executive privilege, which the circuit court did not have a chance to fully
address.205 The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the district court with
instructions that Ralls be provided access to the unclassified evidence on
which the President relied and an opportunity to respond thereto.206 It also
left the validity of the government’s executive privilege defense to the
lower court’s determination.207
Ralls was the first lawsuit in which a foreign investor challenged the
CFIUS process, and the outcome was unexpected.208 The setback, however,
will not significantly weaken the institutional tool in protecting against any
potential threat to U.S. national security of foreign investment through asset
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Id. at 307.
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Liu Jie, News Analysis: Why U.S. Court Sides with Chinese Company in Dispute with Obama?,
XINHUA NEWS (July 21, 2014, 2:25 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/201407/21/c_133499513.htm. The ruling is surprising even to experienced practitioners in the U.S. See, e.g.,
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Ralls v. CFIUS: D.C. Circuit Explains Constitutional Due Process
Requirements
During
CFIUS
Review,
at
4
(July
17,
2014),
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Ralls_v_CFIUS_DC_Circuit_Explains
_Constitutional_Due_Process_Requirements.pdf.
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acquisition.
First, if it chooses to, the government may succeed in shielding much
of CFIUS review information from disclosure with executive privilege in
the future. Though somewhat controversial due to absence in the
Constitution,209 executive privilege—as “the right of the President and highlevel executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the
courts, and ultimately the public”—has been a “well-established
constitutional power with a longstanding history in American
government.”210 While several major issues concerning the exercise of the
privilege and its recognition remain unresolved, and historically its use
varied under different presidencies, “the presumption in favor of the
privilege is the strongest in national security or foreign policy.”211 The
district court on remand drew a timeline for CFIUS to provide Ralls with
access to relevant unclassified materials or otherwise assert executive
privilege.212 CFIUS handed over more than 3,000 pages of documents to
Ralls, claiming privilege over just a few. The two parties subsequently
decided to settle, leaving the issue unresolved.213
Moreover, the substantial compliance of CFIUS with the court ruling
will unlikely overburden the agency in the future as disclosure is required
only for unclassified information.214 CFIUS may reach the same decision by
relying on allegedly classified information. So even though the CFIUS
process may be modified in accordance with the Ralls decision by
incorporating certain procedural guarantees of the foreign investors’ due
process rights, the institution retains wide latitude in screening, altering, and
blocking proposed acquisitions of U.S. assets by foreign investors.
The survey results show that 55% of the respondents had never
considered the issue of CFIUS review.215 23% had considered it but
determined that the law would not apply to their transactions. 12% had filed
the notices and 10% had skipped the filing for low perceived risk. The data
is largely consistent with what is expected from profit-driven rational
foreign investors. Though powerful, CFIUS review applies only to
209

Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 1069, 1069 (1999).
210
Id.
211
MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2010)
212
Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177868, 36 Int’l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1010 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2014)
213
Moreover, because of the settlement, the court did not have a chance to pass on the legality of
CFIUS interim orders.
214
Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
215
Caution should be taken with regard to these findings due to the missing data. It is likely that
most of those who refused to answer this question never considered CFIUS, which would result in a
percentage higher than 55%.
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acquisition of U.S. assets, not greenfield investments.216 Since only 42% of
the responding investors reported to enter the U.S. market through
acquisitions, the majority would have no reason to consider filing a CFIUS
notice. Those that had considered the issue responded to the perceived risk.
The CFIUS notice is voluntary, and the vast majority of the filings
(338/538) are approved without investigation,217 implying their low national
security risk. It is, therefore, sensible to skip the filing in cases where an
easy approval is expected. Consistent with the general findings of
adaptation in the previous section, Chinese investors relied on U.S. lawyers
in dealing with CFIUS. 57% of the respondents reported to have consulted
legal counsel, and 95% had adopted the legal advice.
In sum, despite its recent loss in court, CFIUS remains a powerful tool
to protect against national security threats from Chinese investments. And
consistent with the general findings from the survey, Chinese investors
react rationally and relied on the assistance of U.S. lawyers in complying
with the CFIUS rules.
B. The Phantom Menace of State Capitalism with Chinese
Characteristics
Another concern with Chinese investment in the United States is the
unique state-business relationships in China that allegedly give the Chinese
companies an unfair edge over their American competitors, which the U.S.
legal system may not adequately handle.218 As discussed earlier, China
adopts what is known as a specific variant of capitalism, i.e. state
capitalism, characterized by heavy state intervention in business sectors and
active promotion of business development using state resources.219
The Chinese economy is undergoing a dramatic transformation and the
state-business relationships are in a state of flux.220 Thus, a clear definition
of the Chinese model of capitalism remains at best tentative, and scholars
still debate as to the core elements of the concept.221 That being said, a few
features patently distinguish the Chinese state-business relationships from
216

Greenfield investments are defined as “start-up investment in new facilities.” Bruce Kogut &
Harbir Singh, The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode, 19 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 411,
412 (1988).
217
The number of withdrawn notices, 32, is subtracted from the total number of notices to make the
calculation, assuming those investments posed national security threat.
218
Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the
Mechanism of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 757 (2013).
219
See generally ALDO MUSACCHIO & SERGIO LAZZARINI, REINVENTING STATE CAPITALISM:
LEVIATHAN IN BUSINESS, BRAZIL AND BEYOND (2014).
220
Kellee Tsai, Capitalists without a Class: Political Diversity among Private Entrepreneurs in
China, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 1130, 1138 (2005).
221
For example, a recent debate is about the propriety of focusing too much on SOEs for defining
state capitalism. See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 49.
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those of the United States. First, the state created and nurtured a group of
“truly global Chinese companies that could compete with the large
multinational companies that dominated global production chains.”222
Following the Japanese Keiretsu model, these state-owned national
champions “were allowed to establish their own financial companies.”223 To
strengthen corporate governance and efficiency of these SOEs, the state
engaged in “institutional outsourcing,”224 having many of them listed on
stock exchanges abroad.225
Second, the tie is much closer, especially between the state and the
Chinese SOEs. Senior managers of Chinese SOEs hold administrative ranks
in the government’s nomenklatura at various levels.226 To align the interests
of SOE managers and those of the ruling elite, a sophisticated evaluation
system was established to supervise and incentivize the managers to
achieve the policy objectives of the state.227 For instance, top managers of
central SOEs, some of which are ranked as vice-ministers, may be further
promoted to positions with the rank of minister or higher.228 Promotionoriented SOE managers, therefore, tend to serve the interests of the state
with greater enthusiasm.229
To many private Chinese companies connections with the state are of
utmost importance, as they need the protection of the state to ensure the
security of their investment.230 Ties with government officials serve as a
substitute for formal institutions such as an effective and independent
judiciary.231 Given this heavy reliance on the state, private companies,
especially those owned by red capitalists, are normally loyal followers of
state policies.232
The dependence, however, is mutual, though in a highly tilted manner.
The state attempts to maintain its legitimacy and control over the economy
by co-opting leaders in the private sector.233 Successful business people
were invited to join the ruling elite and wield political influence.234 To a
222
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certain extent, the mutual dependence also reflects state capture.235 Private
companies with abundant resources can influence policy making through
various formal and informal channels such as bribery and lobbying.236
While private lobbying to impact public policy making is universal, in
China it results in close and personal mutual dependence due to the lack of
transparency and institutional checks.
Because of the close state-business relations, Chinese companies may
benefit from all the public resources commanded by the government,237
which has been viewed as a potential threat to American economy.238 This
is not the first time a variable form of capitalism has been perceived as
threatening the fundamentals of the U.S. system. As noted earlier, FDI from
Japan and the anxiety it instilled in Congress led to the Exon-Florio
Amendment.239 Yet over time the U.S. model proved more resilient and the
fear for Japanese companies gradually faded. Does the current alarm about
state capitalism with Chinese characteristics contain anything
unprecedented that amounts to a credible threat, or is it simply the second
round of unnecessary collective panic?
For the following reasons, I contend the Chinese model of state
capitalism in its current form will unlikely pose an existential threat to U.S.
institutions through investment by Chinese companies. While the label of
Japan, Inc. lost much of its substantive meaning in the 1980s as Japanese
policy making was gradually fragmented,240 Chinese control over the
market and the business sector is by no means more integrated or coherent.
The 140,000 Chinese SOEs are subject to control and leadership of
governments at several different administrative levels by a great variety of
agencies.241 Even SASAC, the central agency charged with exercising the
shareholder rights of the central government in some of the largest SOEs,
has to share its power with the SOEs.242
And the state itself is highly fragmented. Power is contested for among
different factions across subject areas and patronage networks. Different
government agencies and ministries, often with diverging interests or policy
WORLD POLITICS 116, 132–33 (2006).
235
Tsai, supra note 220, at 1136.
236
Guosheng Deng & Scott Kennedy, Big Business and Industry Association Lobbying in China:
The Paradox of Contrasting Styles, 63 CHINA J. 101, 111–14 (2010).
237
For a detailed description of measures taken by the Chinese government to promote outbound
investment, see Yadong Luo et al., How Emerging Market Governments Promote Outward FDI:
Experience from China, 45 J. OF WORLD BUS. 68, 75–76 (2010).
238
SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 20, at ix.
239
David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 92 (2009).
240
See generally T. J. Pempel, The Unbundling of “Japan, Inc.”: The Changing Dynamics of
Japanese Policy Formation, 13 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 271 (1987).
241
Li, State-Owned Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 70,
at 401.
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Brødsgaard, supra note 222, at 630–31.
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goals, contend with each other over the control and administration of
business groups.243 In addition, the extent to which the state can effectively
control the SOEs is determined by multiple factors including promotion
probability, the political stature of the top SOE leaders, the salience and
openness of the sector in which the SOEs operate, and the percentage and
density of state ownership.244 Given these structural differences, the
Chinese government simply cannot design or effectively implement the
same type of long-term cross-sector growth strategies as the Japanese
government agencies allegedly did in the 1980s and early 1990s.245
Moreover, due to the way officials are evaluated, promotion-oriented
top executives of Chinese SOEs tend to make short-term cost-benefit
analyses.246 They tend to concentrate on investments that can generate
substantial returns before the end of their current terms or before they are
transferred to another post.247 Such short-term behavior, which is
individually rational in the institutional context of the SOEs, is not
compatible with systemic implementation of long-term economic policies.
Thus, it is unlikely that Chinese companies investing in the U.S. will
coordinate and tolerate short-term losses in the U.S. market to gain market
dominance over the long run.
In addition, after years of reforms of the corporate governance for
SOEs, most of the managers assuming the dual roles of business executive
and party official “increasingly prioritize their economic identities over
their political ones, representing corporate interests.”248 Profitability of
SOEs was set as a key criterion to evaluate the performance of their
managers, and those whose investment decisions led to substantial losses
were penalized.249 Furthermore, the Chinese SOEs, though large by size,
generate profits mainly from their oligopolistic positions in the Chinese
market, a privilege they do not enjoy outside China.
As to large and competitive private companies in China that are
viewed by some as an important component of Chinese state capitalism,250
243

Id. at 631; Margaret M. Pearson, The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and
Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State, 57 WORLD POL. 296, 308–09 (2005); Chih-shian Liou,
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CHINA & INT’L REL. 1, 18–19 (2014).
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their ties to the Chinese government are also segmented. Diversity in
backgrounds and preferences of Chinese entrepreneurs leads to varied
responses to state policies.251 While those benefiting from political
connections are generally “loyally acceptant” of the state rules and policies,
those without tend to be more assertive of their own interests.252 Thus, it is
unlikely that private Chinese companies investing in the U.S. would
constitute a homogeneous group of agents zealously doing the bids of the
Chinese government.
In sum, because power is fragmented within the political structure, the
state-business ties are segmented, and the government control is incapable
of effectively reaching outside the national border, the concept of a
monolithic and omnipotent Chinese state dictating overseas investment
does not well reflect the reality. The survey results bear out this non-threat
argument. As discussed earlier, the Chinese government’s “go global”
policy did not appear to have played a direct and essential role in the actual
investment decisions of Chinese companies.253 And, the profits of Chinese
investors in the U.S. do not deviate from reasonable levels. 45% of the
respondents broke even in 2013. 24% made a profit, and 32% reported a
loss. As noted earlier, 6% reported that U.S. business profits were much
higher than their global profit level. 19% reported to be slightly higher.
39% saw their U.S. profit to be on par with their global profit. 19% reported
lower profit in the United States than globally, and 17% found the profit
level in the United States to be much lower than the global level. From the
data, we cannot detect any sign of extraordinary profits, which would
suggest high competitiveness of Chinese businesses in the U.S. market, or
of unreasonably high losses, which would indicate home state intervention
or subsidy.
To evaluate the potential threat from Chinese business expansion
bankrolled by cash-rich state-owned banks in China,254 the survey inquired
about the financing of Chinese FDI in the U.S. Most Chinese investors
(seventy-two respondents made this selection) used their own earnings to
invest in the United States,255 and thirty-two borrowed from Chinese stateowned banks. Sixteen respondents received loans from non-state owned
banks to finance the investment in the United States; eight respondents
251

Tsai, supra note 220, at 1146.
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Ken Miller, Coping with China’s Financial Power: Beijing’s Financial Foreign Policy, 89
FOREIGN AFF. 96 (2010); Luo et al., supra note 237, at 75. For an example of global acquisition by a
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relied on stock issuance in China, and ten raised capital by issuing securities
outside China. Only six respondents borrowed from Chinese individuals
and companies.
Figure 12: Source of Funding for FDI
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Though the vast majority of the respondents relied on their own
earnings to invest in the United States, and borrowing from state-owned
banks appear to play a secondary role, the overt self-reliance may actually
reflect Chinese government support. Chinese government policies towards
national champions were such that their parents could retain 90% the
profits,256 so most used them for reinvestment.257 Such a favorable policy,
however, is undergoing significant modification and recent rules had set a
target for collecting SOEs’ earnings and profits as a source of government
revenue.258
To address this issue, the respondents were asked to compare

256

Guoqi Lirun Shangjiao Xianzhuang: Wulei Bili Zuigao 20%, 90% Bei Fanhuan
(国企利润上缴现状：五类比例最高20% 90%被返还) [Current Situation of SOE Profits Remission:
Five Categories with Highest Rate of 20%, 90% Returned], CAIJING (财经) (Nov. 15, 2013),
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borrowing in the United States with borrowing in China. Though major
banks in China are all state-owned, they have prioritized profitability in the
lending practice. Some have argued that serving the policy interests of the
state is more a coincidence than the objective of credit issuance to SOEs or
private national champions investing overseas.259 49% of the respondents
considered financing in the United States to be of the same difficulty level
as in China. 23% thought it more difficult in the United States and 27%
found it to be easier. The results suggest that Chinese companies do not
enjoy significant comparative advantages from financing by Chinese policy
banks in making their U.S. investments.260
The fragmentation of state authority also vitiates its capacity to
coordinate the business activities of Chinese companies investing abroad.261
The survey results suggest weak ties or lack of confidence or trust between
the Chinese government and Chinese investors in the United States When
asked in a multiple choice question what to do if facing unfair competition
in the United States, only sixteen intended to seek the assistance of relevant
Chinese authorities, while forty-one would litigate, twenty-eight would
negotiate directly with the competitors, and twenty-seven would solicit the
help of business associations. Even the U.S. governments appeared more
helpful, as twenty-three would petition for its intervention.
When asked what they would do if treated unfairly by the U.S.
government, the most popular choice was to consult a lawyer and follow the
legal advice (sixty-four). That was followed, by a large margin, by
“litigating in a US court” (thirty-five), which tied with “seeking the
assistance of the Chinese government” (thirty-five). Petitioning to relevant
U.S. government departments came in as the next popular choice (thirtytwo). The minor difference between the two choices indicates the lack of
confidence or of close ties between Chinese investors and their home
government.
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Figure 13: How Chinese Investors Respond to Unfair Treatment by the U.S.
Government
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In sum, despite the apparent state dominance over the market and
Chinese companies, the Chinese government lacks requisite capacity to
coordinate long-term and coherent investment strategies in the United
States. Therefore, Chinese investors in the United States are unlikely loyal
agents of formidable state capitalism dedicated to or capable of challenging
U.S. business or the free-market economy. To be sure, some U.S.
companies will face mounting competition from expanding private Chinese
companies that are able to take advantage of cheap labor at home, but U.S.
consumers will ultimately benefit from the intensified competition.
Part VII analyzes in more detail the two potential threats from Chinese
companies investing in the United States, i.e., the threat to national security
and the threat to free market capitalism. Combining the unique survey data
with institutional analysis, the Section demonstrates that the CFIUS review
process remains a powerful mechanism to guard against foreign investment
that potentially threatens U.S. national security, and that the Chinese model
of state capitalism will not likely triumph in battles with the U.S. variant of
free market capitalism.
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VII. THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Based on the first ever comprehensive survey of Chinese companies
investing in the United States, this paper fills major gaps in the extant
literature and debate about the rise of China, its global business expansion,
and the impact on U.S. legal and political systems. According to the survey
findings, Chinese investors are mostly rational and motivated by strategic
business concerns,262 echoing the argument that “the emergence of SOEs’
commercial interests from the process of corporatization has transformed
the firms into market players.”263 Thus, existing theories of FDI that are
predicated on the assumption of rational actors, once modified to
incorporate major Chinese institutional and cultural characteristics, will
likely provide good analytical tools for understanding the actions of
Chinese investors in the United States.
In addition, the survey findings suggest that the fear of recalcitrant
Chinese investors threatening U.S. institutions lacks solid factual basis.
Commercially-motivated Chinese investors hold very positive views about
U.S. business, legal, and political systems and, despite their concerns with
high cost, rely heavily on professionals and local employees. As a result,
most large Chinese investors willingly adapt to the host country
environment and behave in ways similar to their U.S. competitors. In other
words, the investors are mostly “playing our game” by the established rules.
Moreover, the finding of business rationality in China’s outbound
investment also sheds light on the varying motivations and actions of
Chinese investors in different countries. In places of weak state institutions,
Chinese investors, commercially motivated and highly adaptive, will more
likely “export their Chinese problems” by retaining practices such as
disregarding environmental regulations, violating labor rights, and bribing
local officials.264 By comparison, in countries with a sophisticated and
effective legal system and transparent governance, commercially-motivated
Chinese investors generally go after know-how, technology, market, and
global brand, and will act like their local competitors.265
262
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Furthermore, U.S. law safeguarding national security from foreign
investors has evolved in the past three decades and the current CFIUS
process is a powerful gatekeeper, and remains so in spite of CFIUS’s recent
unprecedented loss in Ralls.
The findings of this study also contribute to the nascent debate of state
capitalism with Chinese characteristics. Despite the relative success of the
Chinese government in insulating the economy from the global recession,
the political structure in China and the state-business relationships are such
that the Chinese model of state capitalism will unlikely constitute a
formidable challenge to other variants of capitalism in their home fields.266
Fragmented political power at home constrains the state’s capacity to
orchestrate long-term industrial and investment policies to be implemented
by vastly diverse Chinese companies. Its reach is further curtailed beyond
the state border. As the survey results have shown, when in trouble, Chinese
investors in the United States show more faith in American lawyers and the
host government than their purportedly omnipotent and resourceful home
government.
The empirical findings of this study have significant policy
implications as well. Compared to their Japanese counterparts, Chinese
investors rely more heavily on local employees and professionals, so states
with high unemployment rates will benefit from investment policies
targeted at Chinese companies. In addition, the findings of the study about
the reliance on American service professionals suggest the most effective
way to regulate Chinese investors is through these intermediaries. The
regulations should achieve two distinct policy objectives: (1) to ensure the
professionals will guide Chinese investors in compliance, helping them to
avoid being misdirected by short-term interests of their clients that
contradict U.S. law or public policy, and (2) to prevent the professionals
from abusing the trust and reliance of the Chinese investors. Lack of local
knowledge renders Chinese investors easy prey of scrupulous service
providers in the United States. To protect the rights and interests of foreign
investors and the reputation and integrity of the U.S. market, relevant
authorities should enhance their law enforcement efforts against
professionals targeting Chinese clients. Furthermore, faced with the sharp
rise of Chinese investments, U.S. policymakers should resist the temptation
to indiscriminately erect legal and regulatory barriers, as they have done
previously in response to surging FDI from other source countries,267 unless
doing so is guided by not only unambivalent public policy but also solid
empirical research.
Though this study adds a great deal of much-needed empirical
266
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evidence to the ongoing debate about China’s business globalization and its
impact on U.S. institutions, it leaves open several important questions for
in-depth analysis in the future. Taken as a whole, Chinese investors appear
adaptive to the host country environment. But significant variations exist
within this group in terms of the desire and ability to adapt. What factors
explain such variations? Is the adaptation a function of how long they have
operated in the U.S. market, differences in ownership structure, investment
area, or some other unknown variables yet to be explored? Also, the article
does not explore the exact distribution of investor adaptation among the
four quadrants in the two-by-two matrix (See Figure 3). Some Chinese
companies investing in the United States must fall in Quadrants I, II, and
III, and engage in superficial adaptation or noncompliance with extant U.S.
institutions. As Chinese investment inflows continue to grow, will more
join their rank? How can government policies incentivize a migration to
Quadrant IV? Moreover, as noted earlier, the survey method is not flawless.
Possible biases may weaken the evidentiary power of the findings. Future
studies employing multiple empirical methods are welcome to crossexamine the results and the arguments presented in this article and to test
alternative theoretical explanations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Having overtaken Japan to be the second largest economy in the world
(first if measured by PPP), China is set to surpass the United States in less
than a decade.268 In addition, the Chinese market is nearing saturation and
the cost of labor is skyrocketing.269 Meanwhile, the Chinese government is
actively promoting outbound investment by loosening relevant regulations
and providing policy and monetary incentives for Chinese firms to “go
global.”270 All of these factors contribute to the surge of investment
outflow, making China the third largest source of FDI.271 And the United
States is quickly emerging as the most favorable destination for Chinese
investors.272
The United States has never in its history experienced significant
investment inflows from a developing country that was not a political ally.
The potential size of Chinese investment, the distinct features of the
Chinese economy, and the perceived incompatibility of state capitalism
with a free market economy easily fuel public fear and academic suspicions,
potentially causing a major rebalance between the time-honored American
268
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tradition of keeping an open economy and the urgent need to safeguard U.S.
economic and national security. Given the substantial stake, it is imperative
to get an objective assessment of the “threat” of Chinese investment before
policymakers and lawmakers adopt major defensive measures.
Based on the first large-scale survey of Chinese investors in the United
States, this study finds evidence suggesting that the threat is inflated.
Despite recent damage to American soft power, Chinese investors generally
perceive highly U.S. business, legal, and political institutions. Most of the
investors are commercially-motivated, and are drawn to the United States
by its market, advanced technology, and brand enhancement value. Unlike
their Japanese counterparts, the Chinese investors rely heavily on local
talent. American lawyers, for instance, play an essential role in the
decisions of their Chinese clients. As a result, the adaptive Chinese
investors are by and large “playing our game.”
Also, structural features of Chinese politics determine that its model of
state capitalism may not constitute a credible long-term threat to the United
States. And the CFIUS review, established partially in response to the
perceived threat from Japanese investment in the 1980s and amended over
time, remain a powerful mechanism for protecting core U.S. interests
despite the recent setback in Ralls. In addition, to effectively and costefficiently control “rogue” Chinese investors and to protect those in good
compliance with the U.S. law, relevant authorities should focus on
supervising the professional intermediaries.
In retrospect, Japanese FDI in the United States, much feared and
resented in the 1980s, “increased U.S. competitiveness, employment and
productivity.”273 Regulated properly, Chinese investors may also become an
important stakeholder in extant U.S. business, legal, and political
institutions and a potential contributor to their long-term resilience.
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